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ARTICLES
The Second Adoption of the Establishment
Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment
Principle
Kurt T. Lash
INTRODUCTION
Pity the Establishment Clause.' Today, more than fifty years after its
application against the states, no one seriously believes that this was the
original intent of those who drafted and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment.
When the Supreme Court decided Everson v. Board of Education,2 it did so
with citations to James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, not the members of
the Thirty-ninth Congress. 3 Since Everson, the Court has generally followed
the advice of Justice Clark,4 and dismissed the issue of historical intent as
"of value only as an academic exercise.'5
* Associate Professor, Loyola Law School (Los Angeles). I would like to thank Jay Bybee,
Michael Curtis, David Leonard, Sam Pillsbury, Steven Smith, and Larry Solum for their
encouragement and helpful suggestions. All errors, of course, remain my own. Thanks also to the
indefatigable efforts of my research assistant, John Walsh.
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .... " U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
2. 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
3. Id. at 11-13 (discussing the role played by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson in the
passage of the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty and the adoption of the First Amendment).
4. There are a few notable exceptions. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
254-55 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Illinois ex rel. McCullom v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S.
203, 215 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.).
5. Abington Sch. Dist., 374 U.S. at 217. The issue seemed to be forced upon the Court in
1985 when District Judge Brevard Hand explored the available historical evidence and concluded
that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had not intended to incorporate the Establishment
Clause against the states. Jaffree v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1124 (1983). The
Supreme Court reversed without addressing a single historical argument made by Judge Hand.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 48-49 (1985). Although the Supreme Court regularly refers to
history in its Establishment Clause decisions, invariably the references are to the ideas of the
Founders, and not the intentions of those who drafted and adopted the Fourteenth Amendment. See,
e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 612-15 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring); Rosenberger v.
Rector, 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2528-31 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2535-37 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
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In fact, in the 70 years since Gitlow first incorporated the First
Amendment protections of speech and press against the states,6 the
Establishment Clause has been a boon to incorporation's enemies and an
embarrassment to its friends. Scholars who make the historical case for
general incorporation either ignore, or carefully distinguish, the case of the
Establishment Clause. 7  Anti-incorporationists, on the other hand, use the
case against incorporation of the Establishment Clause as their cause
celebre.
8
So wonderfully ambiguous is the history surrounding this opening line of
the Bill of Rights that originalists use it to attack incorporation, and
nonoriginalists use it to attack originalism.9 For example, at the time of the
Founding, the vast majority of state governments supported and encouraged
religious exercise in one form or another.1° Originalists cite this state of
affairs as evidence that the Establishment Clause could not have been
6. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
7. For example, Professor Akhil Amar notes that the Establishment Clause may not have
contained a "personal freedom" that could be sensibly incorporated against the states. Akhil R.
Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1232 (1992)
[hereinafter Amar, Fourteenth Amendment]; Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution,
100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1157 (1991) [hereinafter Amar, Constitution]. Michael Kent Curtis, whose
work has invigorated so much of recent historical scholarship regarding incorporation, never
specifically addresses the unique case of the Establishment Clause. MICHAEL K. CURTIS, No
STATE SHALL ABRIDGE (1986). Various scholars who are otherwise sympathetic to incorporation
in general have distinguished the historical case for incorporation of the Establishment Clause. See
MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 253
n.19 (1988) ("[Although the right to free exercise of religion is a 'liberty,' the guarantee against
establishment does not protect anything readily characterized as a personal liberty or as property ....
In addition, to the extent that the framers of the first amendment sought to protect state
establishments against national action, it is not entirely coherent to say that the amendment is now
applicable to the states."); Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment
Clause, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 1115, 1136 (1988) ("[The historical evidence] strongly suggests that
the fourteenth amendment, as originally understood, did not incorporate the establishment clause for
application to state government action. ").
8. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: A Reply to Michael Curtis'
Response, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 16 (1983); F. William O'Brien, The Blaine Amendment 1875-1876,
41 U. DET. L. REV. 137, 195-99 (1963); Alfred N. Meyer, The Blaine Amendment and the Bill of
Rights, 64 HARV. L. REV. 939, 941 (1951); Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment
Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 86-87 (1949).
9. For a general introduction to the debate over originalism, see Paul Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980); Daniel A.
Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989);
Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three
Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U.L. REV. 226 (1988); Earl M. Maltz, The Failure of Attacks
on Constitutional Originalism, 4 CONST. COMMENTARY 43 (1987); H. Jefferson Powell, The
Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985).
10. See infra part II.
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intended to apply against the states." Nonoriginalists, on the other hand,
cite the sheer variety of the Founders' views regarding religious
establishments as the primary example of why the search for a single
"original intent" is fundamentally flawed. 1
These conflicting approaches are linked by a common assumption: The
historical period surrounding the adoption of the original Establishment
Clause is directly relevant to determining the intent behind the incorporated
11. See generally, William K. Leitzau, Rediscovering the Establishment Clause: Federalism
and the Rollback of Incorporation, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191, 1210 (1990) ("While many specific
Bill of Rights incorporations have been criticized, none are so thoroughly contradicted by the
historically discernible intentions of our forefathers than that of the establishment clause."); Michael
A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to
Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 314 (1986) ("The Supreme
Court's reading of the religion clauses is completely indefensible-historically, textually, and
practically."); Joseph M. Snee, Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954
WASH. U. L.Q. 371, 407 ("The inclusion of the establishment clause into the liberty of the
Fourteenth Amendment by the Supreme Court has no firm basis in the history of the clause or in
logic . . . ."); Note, Rethinking the Incorporation of the Establishment Clause: A Federalist View,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1700, 1703 (1992). See generally GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE
RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA (1987); ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE:
HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982).
12. See Stephen G. Gey, Why is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of
Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 75, 129 (1990)
("At most, Rehnquist's originalist arguments prove that history provides support for two alternative
traditions concerning the role of religion in our political culture . . . Although history helps to
define the choices between these alternative traditions, it cannot make this choice for us."); Frank
Guliuzza III, The Practical Perils of an Original Intent-Based Judicial Philosophy: Originalism and
the Church-State Test Case, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 343, 372 (1993) (noting originalism's failure to
resolve historical contradictions when it comes to the adoption of the religion clauses); William P.
Marshall, Unprecedential Analysis and Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 925, 930-31
(1986) (arguing that the historical record is ambiguous in regard to whether the establishment clause
was intended to allow accommodation of religion or require strict separation between church and
state); TUSHNET, supra note 7, at 32-36 (arguing that due to the historical ambiguity surrounding
the adoption of the clause, originalist judges are no more "restrained" than nonoriginalist judges);
Mark Tushnet, Religion and Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 33 LOY. L. REV. 221, 229
(1987) ("[D]ifficulties with originalist theories of the establishment clause simply exemplify the
general problem with originalism, which is that social change makes it a theory of constitutional
interpretation that regularly fails to provide guidance on matters of contemporary constitutional
controversy because it disregards the complexities of both the historical record and the current
situation."). See also MARK DEWOLF E. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION
AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 72 (1965) ("In the face of such
pervasive uncertainties as to the meaning of the First Amendment's prohibitions it seems to me
extraordinarily difficult to take seriously the suggestion that the framers and the ratifiers of the
Fourteenth Amendment believed that its adoption was going to have a significant effect upon the
country's religious institutions."). Recently, Steven Smith reflected on the history surrounding the
original adoption of the clause and concluded that the historical search for a substantive principle
underlying the religion clauses is doomed to fail because the clauses were intended to be no more
than a "jurisdictional" allotment of power to the states. STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED
FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 45-48 (1995).
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Establishment Clause. Such an assumption, however, places the Founding
cart before the Incorporation horse. Incorporation doctrine assumes that, at
some point, the people changed their collective mind about the role of
federalism in the protection of individual liberties; what was once left to state
discretion is now restricted by the Fourteenth Amendment. But if the people
changed their mind about the role of federalism in the promotion of
individual liberty, perhaps they also changed their mind about the role of the
Establishment Clause. In fact, we are not the first generation since Madison
wrote his Memorial and Remonstrance to question the melding of the scepter
and the cross. Obscured in the search for the Founders' intent are the
subsequent struggles over the meaning and value of the Establishment
Clause. In the years following the adoption of the Bill of Rights, state after
state grappled with the issue of civil power over the subject of religion.
Slowly, through a long series of cases and controversies, the idea evolved
that citizens ought to be free from government-imposed religious
establishments.
By exploring the reinterpretation of the federal Establishment Clause, I
hope to rehabilitate the Clause and place it on equal footing with the rest of
the incorporated First Amendment. This article does not address the general
debate over the Court's decision to incorporate most of the Bill of Rights by
way of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor does it directly address the debate
over originalism as an interpretive principle. The argument I make is simply
this: To the extent that incorporation of any right can be justified as a matter
of historical intent, there is no less reason to incorporate the Establishment
Clause than any other provision in the First Amendment.
This modest proposition, however, has some significant consequences. If
I am right, then the case of the original Establishment Clause no longer
stands as an argument against originalism or incorporation. Those battles
must be fought on other grounds. More significantly, shifting attention away
from the Founding implies that the intent behind the incorporated
Establishment Clause is not to be found in the writings of Thomas Jefferson
or James Madison (or Joseph Story, for that matter). Instead, the roots of
the modern principle of nonestablishment are located in the contemporary
understanding of personal freedom in the period just after the Civil War.
Part I of this article explores the debates which surrounded the adoption
of the religion clauses. Here I agree with recent scholarship that indicates
the original Establishment Clause was intended to prohibit federal power
over the subject of religion, reserving the same to the states. In this way, the
original Establishment Clause expressed the principle of federalism: The
federal government could neither establish religion at the federal level, nor
[Ariz. St. L.J.1088
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disestablish religion in the states. The Clause made no statement regarding
the merits of religious establishments as such.
Part II traces the evolution of the nonestablishment principle and the
reinterpretation of the Establishment Clause in the first half of the nineteenth
century. As northern state judges struggled with the issue of civil power
over the subject of religion, their decisions increasingly invoked the federal
Establishment Clause in support of the principle of nonestablishment. This
interpretation of the Establishment Clause focused on the rights of the
individual, rather than the prerogatives of the states, and marked a departure
from the federalist roots of the Establishment Clause. Moreover, just as the
original Clause played the dual role of preventing the federal government
from either establishing or disestablishing religion, so the principle of
nonestablishment was understood to prohibit any government from either
supporting or suppressing religion as religion.
Part III looks at events occurring south of the Mason-Dixon line and
explores the regulation of religion in the slaveholding states. Nascent
principles of nonestablishment were trampled upon by the southern
establishment of pro-slavery Christianity and the suppression of "dangerous"
religious ideas. Preventing such suppression of religious belief and
practice-the hallmark of religious establishments-was cited by the
architects of Reconstruction as one of the purposes behind the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The article concludes with a discussion of the Blaine Amendment and the
implications of a nonestablishment jurisprudence that focuses on the second
adoption of the Establishment Clause.
I. THE ORIGINAL PRINCIPLE OF "No POWER" OVER THE SUBJECT OF
RELIGION
A. The Federalist Establishment Clause
From the beginning, the Establishment Clause has been about power.
Following the convention in Philadelphia, the Constitution was sent to the
several states for debate over its ratification. Those opposing the
Constitution were especially vocal about the lack of a bill of rights which
protected, among other things, the "rights of conscience." 13 Proponents of
13. See AN OLD WHIG, NO. 5 (Fall 1787), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION
85, 86-87 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) [hereinafter FOUNDERS' CONST.] ("[If a
majority of the continental legislature should at any time think fit to establish a form of religion, for
the good people of this continent, with all the pains and penalties which in other countries are
108927:1085]
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the new Constitution responded by pointing out that the proposed federal
government would have no legitimate power over the subject of religion.
According to Madison in the Virginia ratification debates, "[t]here is not a
shadow of right in the general government to intermeddle with religion. Its
least interference with it, would be a most flagrant usurpation."' James
Iredell in the North Carolina convention declared:
Upon the principles I have stated, I confess the restriction on the
power of Congress, in this particular, has my hearty approbation.
They certainly have no authority to interfere in the establishment of
any religion whatsoever; and I am astonished that any gentleman
should conceive they have. Is there any power given to Congress
in matters of religion? Can they pass a single act to impair our
religious liberties? If they could, it would be a just cause of alarm.
If they could, sir, no man would have more horror against it than
myself. Happily, no sect here is superior to another. As long as
this is the case, we shall be free from those persecutions and
distractions with which other countries have been torn. 15
Madison, of course, objected to religious establishments on separationist
grounds: He believed that no government, state or federal, had any
legitimate power over religion as such.1 6 Separationists, however, were not
the only ones who insisted that the federal government have no authority
over religion. During the drafting of what would become the religion
clauses of the First Amendment, representatives from states with established
religions expressed their concerns that the proposed phrasing "no religion
shall be established by law" might be construed as an excuse for the federal
annexed to the establishment of a national church, what is there in the proposed constitution to
hinder their doing so? Nothing; for we have no bill of rights, and every thing therefore is in their
power and at their discretion."); see also A MARYLAND FARMER, No. 7 (Apr. 11, 1788), reprinted
in FOUNDERS' CONST. supra, at 87, 88.
14. James Madison, Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 12, 1788), in FOUNDERS' CONST.,
supra note 13, at 88, 88.
15. James Iredell, Debate in North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 30, 1788), in
FOUNDERS' CONST., supra note 13, at 89, 90; see also id. at 92 (remarks of Mr. Spaight) ("As to
the subject of religion, I thought what had been said would fully satisfy that gentleman and every
other. No power is given to the general government to interfere with it at all. Any act of Congress
on this subject would be a usurpation.").
16. See James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (June
20, 1785), in FOUNDERS' CONST., supra note 13, at 82, 82 ("We maintain therefore that in matters
of Religion, no mans [sic] right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society and that Religion is
wholly exempt from its cognizance."). Madison also unsuccessfully attempted to amend the federal
Constitution to prevent states from interfering with the "equal rights of conscience." House of
Representatives, Amendments to the Constitution (Aug. 15, 1789), in FOUNDERS' CONST., supra
note 13, at 92, 93 (remarks of Mr. Madison).
1090 [Ariz. St. LTJ
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government to interfere with state regulation of religion. According to
Representative Huntington:
[H]e feared ... that the words might be taken in such latitude as to
be extremely hurtful to the cause of religion .... The ministers of
their congregations to the Eastward were maintained by the
contributions of those who belonged to their society; the expense of
building meetinghouses was contributed in the same manner.
These things were regulated by by-laws. If an action was brought
before a Federal Court on any of these cases, the person who had
neglected to perform his engagements could not be compelled to do
it; for a support of ministers, or building of places of worship
might be construed into a religious establishment.'
7
The version ultimately adopted satisfies Huntington's concern by
prohibiting Congress from making any "law respecting an establishment of
religion." This wording simultaneously forbids the federal government from
establishing a religion at the federal level, or attempting to disestablish
religion at the state level. Either attempt would be a law "respecting an
establishment of religion." i' Such deference to the principle of federalism
echoes the general tenor of the antifederalists' call for a bill of rights. In
fact, when Madison proposed an amendment which would have required that
"no State shall infringe the equal rights of conscience," 19 Mr. Tucker
responded that "[it will be much better, I apprehend, to leave the State
Governments to themselves, and not to interfere with them more than we
already do; and that is thought by many to be rather too much.",
20
Madison's proposal passed the House but was rejected in the Senate.2 '
In the end, the prohibition on establishments was limited to the federal
government and was worded in a way that would satisfy the concerns of
representatives from states with existing religious establishments. 22  Under
17. House of Representatives, Amendments to the Constitution (Aug. 15, 1789) (remarks of
Mr. Huntington), in FOUNDERS' CONST., supra note 13, at 92, 93.
18. As a number of scholars have previously noted. See Amar, Constitution, supra note 7, at
1157; Lietzau, supra note 11, at 1199; Paulsen, supra note 11, at 321-23; Note, supra note I], at
1705.
19. House of Representatives, Amendments to the Constitution (Aug. 17, 1789), in
FOUNDERS' CONST., supra note 13, at 92, 93.
20. Id. at 93-94.
21. See Amar, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 7, at 1202.
22. Gerard Bradley argues that the ultimate language of the Establishment Clause implies
only a partial renunciation of power over the subject of religion. He bases this view on the fact that
an earlier version proposed by New Hampshire's Samuel Livermore ("Congress shall make no law
touching religion, or infringing the rights of conscience") would have completely denied Congress
power over the subject of religion. Because this version was rejected in favor of a (supposedly)
narrower prohibition on laws respecting an establishment of religion, this indicates that the
27:1085] 1091
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the federal Establishment Clause, religious establishments were neither good
nor bad-they were simply a matter left to the states. On this issue, the
federal government was to remain agnostic.
B. Post-Adoption Commentary on the Establishment Clause and "No
Federal Power" Over the Subject of Religion
Post-adoption commentary on the religion clauses is remarkably
consistent in its description of the "no federal power" principle behind the
religion clauses. 2 3  In his Kentucky Resolutions against the Alien andSedition Act, Thomas Jefferson noted that:
limitation on congressional power over the subject of religion was only partial. BRADLEY, supra
note 11, at 92-96; see also SMITH, supra note 12, at 31-33. Although there is no record of why
Livermore's proposal was rejected, Bradley's interpretation seems particularly inappropriate. To
begin with, the ultimate version is much more explicit in its ban on federal interference with state
religious establishments. That reason alone might have been enough to make the final version more
attractive than Livermore's. Secondly, Bradley's idea that the drafters of the Bill of Rights were
concerned with protecting certain areas of federal power over the subject of religion is startling,
given the anti-federal power sentiment of the antifederalists and the separationist views of men like
James Madison. Finally, whatever the reason for choosing the ultimate language over Livermore's
proposal, there is a complete dearth of post-adoption interpretation of the Establishment Clause
along the lines that Bradley proposes.
23. I have located only one example of a contemporary interpretation of the religion clauses
that would allow for some exercise of federal power over the subject of religion. According to the
Virginia Senate's critique of the proposed religion clauses:
The 3rd amendment, recommended by Congress, does not prohibit the rights of
conscience from being violated or infringed; and although it goes to restrain
Congress from passing laws establishing any national religion, they might,
notwithstanding, levy taxes to any amount, for the support of religion or its
preachers; and any particular denomination of Christians might be so favored
and supported by the General Government as to give it a decided advantage
over others, and in process of time render it as powerful and dangerous as if it
was established as the national religion of the country.
BRADLEY, supra note 11, at 117. Gerard Bradley calls this statement "the clearest, most concise,
most authoritative definition of the religious clauses in the entire history of ratification by the
states." Id. at 118. Why this statement should have such considerable standing is not clear,
especially considering the fact that no one else forwarded a similar interpretation either before or
after the adoption of the Bill of Rights. In fact, Bradley concedes that this interpretation was
prompted by a group of antifederalists who were attempting to derail the adoption of the Bill of
Rights in order to force a second constitutional convention. Id. at 117; see also Kurt T. Lash,
Rejecting Conventional Wisdom: Federalist Ambivalence in the Framing and Implementation of
Article V, 38 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 197 (1994).
Bradley's ultimate point is to refute the idea that the Establishment Clause was intended to
forbid aid to religion. In support of this view, Bradley refers to various laws passed by Congress in
the Founding period which involved aid to religion in one manner or another. BRADLEY, supra
note 11, at 97-104. The significance of state aid in this'period, however, is ambiguous. See infra
pp. 1095-98. Moreover, Bradley's rejection of the no-federal-power principle is contradicted by an
almost unanimous chorus of federalists and antifederalists, as well as both pro and anti-
establishmentarians. See this part. Nevertheless, I believe Bradley is right to criticize past "no
1092
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"[T]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the
states respectively, or to the people;" and that, no power over the
freedom of religion. . . being delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, all lawful powers
respecting the same did of right remain, and were reserved to the
states, or to the people.24
Jefferson further notes that the Alien and Sedition Acts violated rights
belonging to the "several states. "25
Likewise in Virginia, the debate over the constitutionality of the Sedition
Acts reveals a widespread understanding that the Establishment Clause
prohibited federal power over the subject of religion. The great Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, John Marshall, although arguing in favor of
congressional power over speech and the press, nevertheless conceded that
the phrase "respecting" in the Establishment Clause implied that Congress
had no power over the subject of religion:
Congress is prohibited from making any law RESPECTING a
religious establishment, but not from any law RESPECTING the
press. When the power of Congress relative to the press is to be
limited, the word RESPECTING is dropt [sic], and Congress is
only restrained from the passing any law ABRIDGING its liberty.
This difference of expression with respect to religion and the press,
manifests a difference of intention with respect to the power of the
incidental aid" decisions by the Supreme Court, where such aid is generally distributed along secular
lines. See infra part III.
24. Kentucky Resolutions (Nov. 10 & 14, 1798), reprinted in FOUNDERS' CONST., supra,
note 13, at 131, 132. In 1830, Senator and future Vice-President of the United States Richard M.
Johnson noted:
Congress acts under a constitution of delegated and limited powers. The
committee looks in vain to that instrument for a delegation of power
authorizing this body to inquire and determine what part of time, or whether
any, has been set apart by the Almighty for religious exercises. On the
contrary, among the few prohibitions which it contains, is one that prohibits a
religious test, and another which declares that Congress shall pass no law
respecting an establishing of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
2 ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 17 (1950).
25. Kentucky Resolutions, reprinted in FOUNDERS' CONST., supra note 13, at 133-34
("[Tihis commonwealth does therefore call on its co-states for an expression of their sentiments on
the acts concerning aliens . . . . That they will view this as seizing the rights of the states, and
consolidating them in the hands of the general government, with a power assumed to bind the states,
not merely in cases made federal, but in all cases whatsoever .... ").
109327:1085]
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national legislature over those subjects, both in the person who
drew, and in those who adopted this amendment.26
James Madison rejected Marshall's attempt to distinguish the "respecting"
language from the rest of the First Amendment and maintained that "the
liberty of conscience and freedom of the press were equally and completely
exempted from all authority whatever of the United States." 27 Whatever the
merits of Marshall's approach to power over speech, it is telling that both he
and Madison agreed that there was no federal power over the subject of
religion.
28
Legal treatises of the day also reflected the "no power" reading of the
religion clauses. According to William Rawle in his 1829 treatise on the
Constitution, "[t]he first amendment prohibits [C]ongress from passing any
law respecting an establishment of religion; or preventing the free exercise of
it. It would be difficult to conceive on what possible construction of the
Constitution such a power could ever be claimed by [C]ongress." 29  Even
pro-establishment Joseph Story, in his famous Commentaries on the
26. John Marshall, Report of the Minority on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 22, 1799),
reprinted in FOUNDERS' CONST., supra note 13, at 136, 138.
27. JAMES MADISON, MADISON'S REPORT ON THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS (1800), reprinted
in 4 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 546, 576 (Ayer Co., 1987)
(1888).
28. In fact, both Madison and Jefferson collapsed the religion clauses into the single
proposition that federal government had no power over the subject of religion. In his Virginia
Resolutions, Madison argued that the federal government had no more power over "the free
exercise of religion" than it did over "laws respecting establishments." See JAMES MADISON,
REPORT ON THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS (Jan. 1800), reprinted in FOUNDERS' CONST., supra note
13, at 141, 146. Similarly, Jefferson described the religion clauses as "the provision that no law
shall be made respecting the establishment, or free exercise, of religion .... ." Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Rev. Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), in FOUNDERS' CONST., supra note 13, at 98, 98
(emphasis added). Jefferson continues: "Certainly no power to prescribe any religious exercise, or
to assume authority in religious discipline, has been delegated to the general government. It must
then rest with the states, as far as it can be in any human authority." Id.
29. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1829),
reprinted in FOUNDERS' CONST., supra note 13, at 106, 106. Rawle continues: "The time has long
passed by when enlightened men in this country entertained the opinion that the general welfare of a
nation could be promoted by religious intolerance, and under no other clause could a pretence for it
be found. Individual states whose legislatures are not restrained by their own constitutions, have
been occasionally found to make some distinctions; but when we advert to those parts of the
Constitution of the United States, which so strongly enforce the equality of all our citizens, we may
reasonably doubt whether the denial of the smallest civic right under this pretence can be reconciled
to it." Id.
30. Story argued against the complete disestablishment of religion in his home state of
Massachusetts. See 2 WILLIAM G. McLOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND DISSENT: 1630-1833, at 1150,
1158 & 1255 (1971).
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Constitution,31 agreed with Madison and Jefferson that "the whole power
over the subject of religion is left exclusively to the state governments, to be
acted upon according to their own sense of justice, and the state
constitutions." 32
In a variety of controversies that arose in the early nineteenth century,
both Congress and the Supreme Court interpreted the Establishment Clause
as a limitation on the power of Congress, and a preservation of power in the
states. In 1810, Congress passed a law requiring federal post offices to
33
remain open every day there was mail. For the next two decades,
Congress was flooded with petitions claiming this violated the Christian duty
to keep the Sabbath holy. In a report issued in 1829 by the Senate
Committee on Post Office and Post Roads, Senator and future vice-president
of the United States Richard M. Johnson rejected the notion that Congress
should repeal a law on the ground that it was contrary to the law of God.
Johnson believed that:
If this principle is once introduced, it will be impossible to define
its bounds .... [Tihe Constitution has wisely withheld from our
Government the power of defining the divine law. It is a right
reserved to each citizen; and while he respects the equal rights of
others, he cannot be held amenable to any human tribunal for his
conclusions. 
35
In a version of his report later published in book form, Johnson notes that
power over religion remains a prerogative of the states:
But were it expedient to put an end to the transmission of letters
and newspapers on Sunday because it violates the law of God, have
not the petitioners begun wrong in their efforts? If the arm of
government be necessary to compel man to respect and obey the
laws of God, do not the state governments possess infinitely more
power in this respect?
36
31. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
(Carolina Acad. Press 1987) (1833).
32. Id. § 992. Unlike Madison, however, Story thought that such power had been delegated
to the state legislatures and that those legislatures had "the especial duty . . . to foster, and
encourage [Christianity] among all the citizens and subjects." Id. § 986. See generally infra part
III.
33. See ANSON PHELPS STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED
STATES 253 (1964) (One volume edition) [hereinafter 4 STOKES].
34. Id.
35. 2 STOKES, supra note 24, at 15-16.
36. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON POST-OFFICES AND POST-ROADS OF THE UNITED
STATES SENATE (Jan. 1829), reprinted in SOCIAL THEORIES OF JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY 274
(Joseph L. Blau ed., 1947).
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In 1833, the Supreme Court rejected an appeal from Catholic priests who
had been convicted under a New Orleans city ordinance forbidding open
casket funerals. 37 Counsel for the City argued that the federal Constitution
did not forbid "the enactment of law or ordinance, under state authority, in
reference to religion. The limitation of power in the [F]irst [A]mendment to
the Constitution is upon Congress, and not the states.,38 The Court agreed
and held that "protecting the citizens of the respective states in their religious
liberties . . . is left to the state constitutions and laws; nor is there any
inhibition imposed by the Constitution of the United States in this respect on
the states. 09
Of course, just what constituted "power over the subject of religion" was
a matter of considerable debate. As Gerard Bradley has pointed out, the new
federal government engaged in a variety of actions that could be construed as
exercises of power over the subject of religion.4 For example, from the
41beginning Congress provided for congressional and military chaplains,
various Presidents throughout the period issued Thanksgiving
proclamations,4 2 and a number of actions in the territories implicated
religion, including provision for missionary schools and laws prohibiting
blasphemy and mandating observance of the Sabbath.43
Each of these examples, however, is ambiguous in regard to whether it
violated the "no power" principle. To begin with, not even Madison
believed that Thanksgiving proclamations were direct exercises of power
over the subject of religion; rather, it was their implied delegation of
authority in religious matters that offended him.44 Congress defended the
37. Permoli v. New Orleans, 44 U.S. 589 (1845).
38. Id. at 606.
39. Id. at 609. Dissenting in the case Ex parte Garland, Justice Miller objected to the courts'
striking down on ex post facto grounds a law requiring priests to take an oath that they had
supported the union. According to Miller, "the whole power over the subject of religion is left
exclusively to the State governments, to be acted upon according to their own sense of justice and
the State constitutions." 71 U.S. 333, 397-98 (1867) (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1878). This part of Justice Miller's dissent applied
to the accompanying case, Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1867).
40. BRADLEY, supra note 11, at 97-104.
41. For a general discussion of the history behind congressional chaplains, see Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786-90 (1983).
42. See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, PROCLAMATION (Nov. 16, 1814), reprinted in FOUNDERS'
CONST., supra note 13, at 102.
43. See generally BRADLEY, supra note 11, at 97-104; CHESTER J. ANTIEAU ET AL.,
FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT: FORMATION AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES 159 (1964).
44. See James Madison, Detached Memoranda (ca. 1817), in FOUNDERS' CONST., supra
note 13, at 105 ("AItho' recommendations only, they imply a religious agency, making no part of
the trust delegated to political rulers."). More forcefully, Jefferson argued that even a
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traditional appointment of congressional and military chaplains on Free
45Exercise grounds and explicitly renounced any attempt to exercise power
46
along religious lines. In regard to the funding of sectarian schools for the
Native Americans, it remained an issue throughout the nineteenth century
whether incidental aid to a sectarian organization violated the principle of
recommendation might carry the "penalty" of "proscription perhaps in [adverse] public opinion,"
and that this assumed authority over religious exercises which properly belonged in the states.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev. Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), in FOUNDERS' CONST.,
supra note 13, at 98, 99.
45. See JAMES THOMPSON, H.R. REP. No. 171, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1850) (James
Thompson), available in UNITED STATES SERIAL SET No. 583 ("Were the office [of military
chaplain] abolished, the soldier or sailor might with more than a show of plausibility complain that
the "free exercise" of religion was denied him; that his constitutional rights were infringed."); H.R.
REP. NO. 124, 33d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1854) (Mr. Meachum), available in UNITED STATES SERIAL
SET NO. 743 ("If you do not afford them the means of religious service while at sea, the Sabbath is,
to all intents and purposes, annihilated, and we do not allow the crews the free exercise of
religion."). Madison himself recognized the force of the Free Exercise argument in regard to
military chaplains. See James Madison, Detached Memoranda (ca. 1817), in FOUNDERS' CONST.,
supra note 13, at 104 ("The object [of army and navy chaplains] is seducing; the motive to it is
laudible. But is it not safer to adhere to a right principle, and trust to its consequences, than confide
in the reasoning however specious in favor of a wrong one .... The case of navies with insulated
crews may be less within the scope of these reflections.").
Criticisms of the appointment of federal chaplains were themselves based on the idea that the
federal government had no power over the subject of religion. See INHABITANTS OF LIVINGSTON
COUNTY, KENTUCKY, REMONSTRANCE AGAINST THE APPOINTMENT OF CHAPLAINS TO
CONGRESS, H.R. DOC. NO. 9, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1833), available in UNITED STATES
SERIAL SET NO. 254; see also KEHUKEE PRIMITIVE BAPTIST ASSOCIATION IN NORTH CAROLINA,
MEMORIAL, S. MISC. DOC. NO. 2, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1848), available in UNITED STATES
SERIAL SET NO. 533.
46. According to an 1853 Senate Judiciary Report, Senator Badger declared that religious
establishments were:
inconsistent with religious freedom, as a matter of natural right to be enjoyed
in its full latitude, and not measured out by tolerance and concession from the
civil rulers. If Congress has passed, or should pass, any law which, fairly
construed, has in any degree introduced, or should attempt to introduce, in
favor of any church, or ecclesiastical association, or system of religious faith,
all or any one of these obnoxious particulars-endowment at the public
expense, peculiar privileges to its members, or disadvantages or penalties upon
those who should reject its doctrines or belong to other communions-such law
would be a "law respecting an establishment of religion." . . . But no law yet
passed by Congress is justly liable to such an objection.
S. REP. No. 376, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1853), available in UNITED STATES SERIAL SET NO. 671.
Badger argued that the particular religious choices made by the individual Congressmen could not
be ascribed to the law, which itself made "no distinction whatever between any of the religions,
churches, or professions of faith known to the world. Of these none, by law, is excluded; none has
any priority of legal right. True, selections, in point of fact, are always made from some one of the
denominations into which Christians are distributed; but that is not in consequence of any legal right
or privilege, but by the voluntary choice of those who have the power of appointment." Id. at 3.
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separation of church and state.47  Finally, territorial regulations involving
blasphemy and the Sabbath breaking make perfect sense given the dual
nature of the original Establishment Clause: as proto-states, territorial
governments would be presumed to have all the powers not forbidden to
them by the Federal Constitution.48  Also, territorial regulations involving
blasphemy and Sabbath breaking make perfect sense given the agnostic
nature of the original Establishment Clause. However inappropriate it may
have been for territorial governments to enact laws that violated the
substantive principles of the Bill of Rights-say abridging speech or the right
to jury trial-no substantive principle would be violated by the mere exercise
of power over the subject of religion.49  Freedom from establishments was
not yet considered a fundamental right.
This is not to say that all congressional actions and motives during this
period were consistent with the principle of "no federal power" over the
subject of religion. 50  Nevertheless, statements by those involved in the
47. See Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 81-82 (1908) (upholding use of Native American
treaty funds for the funding of Catholic schools on the principle of free exercise of religion);
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 295-300 (1899) (upholding congressional appropriation for
hospital run by Catholic nuns). Land grants for the erection of churches and provision for the
establishment of missionary schools raise troubling questions regarding the faithful application of
the "no power principle." See CORD, supra note 11, at 57-80. On the other hand, most of these
provisions are ambiguous in their significance regarding government power over religion. For
example, Jefferson's treaty with the Kaskasia Indians, which provided for a grant of money for the
maintenance and support of a Catholic church for the tribe, was part "compensation for the
relinquishment made to the United States in the first article." See id. at 38. The money spent was
thus the tribe's, not the federal government's. See Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. at 80.
Likewise, the provision for educational missions was made in the pursuit of otherwise secular goals
(education of the Native Americans). Again, this is not to say that evangelization was beyond the
intentions of the parties involved. However, it may well have been the ambiguous nature of such
aid that allowed it to continue despite a constant and unanimous chorus of voices both at the state
and federal level that the government had no legitimate power over the subject of religion.
48. See SMITH, supra note 12, at 28 (Acting in its role as territorial governor, Congress may
have "acted essentially as a state and hence continued to enjoy all the powers that the religion
clauses concededly left to the states."). According to Bradley, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787
"presumed to extend to the territories the 'fundamental principles of civil and religious liberty'
guaranteed by the state constitutions." BRADLEY, supra note 11, at 101. Exactly right. State
constitutions in the early part of the nineteenth century assumed state power over the subject of
religion.
49. Nor would jurists of the early nineteenth century understand such laws to violate free
exercise. Most state constitutions at that time simultaneously tolerated some degree of free exercise
while giving the state power to regulate dissenting religions that were considered threats to the
established culture. See infra pp. 1100-05.
50. For example, Senator Meacham in his 1854 House Judiciary Report on Chaplains rejected
the idea that Congress can make no provision for the exercise of Christianity. H.R. REP. No. 124,
supra note 45, at 6 ("At the time of the adoption of the of the constitution and the amendments, the
universal sentiment was that Christianity should be encouraged-not any one sect. Any attempt to
level and discard all religion, would have been viewed with universal indignation."). Other
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framing of the Establishment Clause, early constitutional treatise writers,
numerous congressional leaders, and even the Supreme Court, are
remarkably consistent in their interpretation of the Establishment Clause as
representing no power to the federal government and reserving the same to
the states.
C. Incorporation and the Federalist Establishment Clause
For incorporationists, a federalist Establishment Clause poses a problem.
Whether accomplished through the Due Process Clause, or as recent
scholarship suggests, the "Privilege or Immunities" Clause, 5 1 incorporation
assumes the existence of a personal freedom that can sensibly be protected
against state action. But how can the original Establishment Clause-an
expression of the rights (or powers) of states-be read as a personal liberty
against the states? It would make just as much (or as little) sense to
incorporate the Tenth Amendment.52 For this reason, some scholars have
concluded that, whatever may be the case for the rest of the Bill of Rights,
the Establishment Clause is a uniquely unfit candidate for incorporation. 53
The problem with this argument is that it assumes that the Establishment
Clause meant the same thing in 1868 that it did in 1789. If it did, then the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment could not have intended to
incorporate that Clause, even if they intended to incorporate the rest of the
First Amendment. On the other hand, what if the words of the
Establishment Clause had been reinterpreted to express the principle that no
person should be subject to state-imposed religious establishments? If this
was the understanding of the Establishment Clause circa 1868, then it would
not have been illogical for the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment to
proponents of congressional chaplains realized the argument in their favor was less strong than in
the case of military chaplains. See THOMPSON, H.R. REP. No. 171, supra note 45, at 4 ("The
propriety and necessity for [congressional chaplains] does not, perhaps, stand upon an equal footing
in some respects with that of the services already referred to. . . . Time and usage have given
sanction to the employment of chaplains.").
51. See generally Amar, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 7; CURTIS, supra note 7; see also
Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57
(1993).
52. See Conkle, supra note 7, at 1141; see also TUSHNET, supra note 7, at 252-53
("Originalist strict separation cannot account for the indisputable fact that most framers explicitly
understood that the religion clauses were designed to bar the national government from certain
actions, among which was interference with existing establishments or religion in the states.
BRADLEY, supra note 11, at 95.
53. See Amar, Constitution, supra note 7, at 1157-60; Leitzau, supra note 11, at 1206-11.
Steven Smith has concluded that, because of the federalist nature of the original religion clauses,
neither clause contained any substantive content that could later be incorporated against the states.
See SMITH, supra note 12, at 17-54.
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expect its incorporation along with the rest of the First Amendment. In other
words, we cannot know whether there was an intention to incorporate the
Establishment Clause without understanding the status of that Clause at the
time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. That question, however,
requires an extended look at the evolution of nonestablishment in the period
between the Founding and Reconstruction.
II. CHRISTIANITY AND THE COMMON LAW
A. The Common Law and Protestant Christianity
Christianity, general christianity is and always has been, a part of
common law . . . not Christianity founded on any particular
religious tenets; not christianity with an established church, and
tithes, and spiritual courts; but Christianity with liberty of
54
conscience to all men.
At the Founding, although numerous state constitutions protected "free
exercise" or the "rights of conscience, " 55 no state constitution prohibited a
"law respecting an establishment of religion." 56 In fact, many acknowledged
Christianity and made some provision for its support. 57 According to Joseph
Story:
Probably at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and of the
amendment to it, now under consideration, the general, if not the
universal, sentiment in America was, that Christianity ought to
receive encouragement from the state, so far as it is not
incompatible with the private rights of conscience, and the freedom
of religious worship. An attempt to level all religions, and make it
54. Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394 (Pa. 1824), reprinted in
FOUNDERS' CONST., supra note 13, at 170.
55. See generally Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990).
56. See generally Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious
Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1106, 1111 (1994).
57. For example, the Vermont Constitution of 1786 declared:
[N]o authority can, or ought to be vested in, or assumed by any power
whatsoever, that shall in any case interfere with, or in any manner control the
rights of conscience, in the free exercise of religious worship: Nevertheless,
every sect or denomination of Christians ought to observe the Sabbath or
Lord's day, and keep up some sort of religious worship, which to them shall
seem most agreeable to the revealed will of God.
VT. CONST. OF 1786, ch. 1, art. 3, reprinted in FOUNDERS' CONST., supra note 13, at 85.
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a matter of state policy to hold all in utter indifference, would have
created universal disapprobation, if not universal indignation.58
The most (in)famous examples of religious establishments in this period
were the religious tax assessments in the New England States. 59 In the early
decades of the nineteenth century, however, the last of these assessment
schemes fell in a withering crossfire of criticism from both Separationists and
disgruntled minority religions. 6° Although the so-called "disestablishment
movement" has been well-discussed elsewhere, 61 the role this movement has
played in Establishment Clause mythology warrants some reflection. A
number of scholars and Supreme Court Justices have suggested that the fall
of the last assessment in 1833 signaled the triumph of separationism in the
states.62 Thus, by the time of Reconstruction, federalist concerns about state
power to establish religion no longer barred Jefferson and Madison's original
views about the separation of Church and State.
63
There are some serious problems with this view. First, as Professor
Conkle has pointed out, had the Establishment Clause been understood to
include Madisonian values of separatism, it would not have been enacted. 64
Secondly, state power over the subject of religion remained alive and well in
the states long after the fall of the last tax assessment. The establishment
was not statutory: it was an inherent part of the common law.
1. The Common Law Crime of Blasphemy
In the common law blasphemy case, Ruggles v. People of New York,65
Chancellor Kent conceded that, in New York, "[t]he free, equal, and
58. STORY, supra note 31, at § 988.
59. See 1 STOKES, supra note 24, at 358-446.
60. See McConnell, supra note 55, at 1469-7 1.
61. See generally 2 McLOUGHLIN, supra note 30.
62. See William Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling
Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 772-78 (1984); LAURENCE TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1156 n.5 (2d ed. 1988); see also Abington Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 254-58 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Amar, Constitution,
supra note 7, at 1158 n.131 ("On the other hand, because states had dissolved their formal
establishments well before the Civil War, and at least one state had adopted a state establishment
clause with 'respecting' language tracking that of the federalist First Amendment, the original
federalism dimension of the federal clause was probably less obvious in the 1860's than in the early
1800's. ").
63. Van Alstyne, supra note 62, at 778-79; TRIBE, supra note 62, at 1156, n.5.
64. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (remarks of Representative Huntington at
Philadelphia Convention); see also Conkle, supra note 7, at 1135 n.109; SMITH, supra note 12, at
21-22; STORY, supra note 31, § 988.
65. 8 Johns 290 (N.Y. 1811), reprinted in FOUNDERS' CONST., supra note 13, at 101. The
defendant had declared that "'Jesus Christ was a bastard, and his mother must be a whore."' Id.
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undisturbed, enjoyment of religious opinion, whatever it may be, and free
and decent discussions on any religious subject, is granted and secured."
Nevertheless, "to revile, with malicious and blasphemous contempt, the
religion professed by almost the whole community, is an abuse of that
right. '' 66  Significantly, the law presumed a Christian community.
According to Kent:
Nor are we bound, by any expressions in the constitution, as some
have strangely supposed, either not to punish at all, or to punish
indiscriminately the like attacks upon the religion of Mahomet or of
the grand Lama; and for this plain reason, that the case assumes
that we are a christian people, and the morality of the country is
deeply ingrafted upon christianity, and not upon the doctrines or
worship of those impostors. 67
Ruggles was the seminal opinion in a series of cases in the early
nineteenth century that presumed that Christianity was part of the common
law. In the 1824 blasphemy case Updegraph v. Commonwealth, Justice
Duncan for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court quotes approvingly from
Ruggles, including Chancellor Kent's restriction to attacks on Christianity.
69
Duncan then notes that "[n]o society can tolerate a willful and despiteful
attempt to subvert its religion, no more than it would break down its laws-a
general, malicious, and deliberate intent to overthrow Christianity, general
Christianity."7 ° Similarly, in the 1844 case Vidal v. Girard's Executors,7'
66. Id.
67. Id. Note that Chancellor Kent is not merely expressing deference to the scruples of the
majority, whatever their religion. Contenders for the souls of Americans are "impostors" with no
right to have their views admitted to the sturm and drang of public debate. But cf. Robert Post,
Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the First Amendment, 76 CAL. L.
REV. 297, 318 (1988) (Kent's opinion is reducible to "breach of peace" principles.).
68. 11 Serg. & Rawle 394 (Pa. 1824), reprinted in FOUNDERS' CONST., supra note 13, at
170. The defendant had declared "'[that the Holy Scriptures were a mere fable, that they were a
contradiction, and that although they contained a number of good things, yet they contained a great
many lies.'" Id.
69. Id. at 173 ("In the Supreme Court of New York it was solemnly determined, that
Christianity was part of the law of the land, and that to revile the Holy Scriptures was an indictable
offense. The case assumes, says Chief Justice Kent, that we are a Christian people, and the
morality of the country is deeply engrafted on Christianity. Nor are we bound by any expression in
the constitution, as some have strangely supposed, not to punish at all, or to punish indiscriminately
the like attack upon Mahomet or the Grand Lima.").
70. Id. Duncan distinguishes blasphemy from "good faith" theological disputes, and lists the
"species of offense" under the following classifications: "1. Denying the Being and Providence of
God. 2. Contumelious reproaches of Jesus Christ; profane and malevolent scoffing at the
Scriptures, or exposing any part of them to contempt and ridicule. 3. Certain immoralities tending
to subvert all religion and morality, which are the foundations of all governments. Without these
restraints no free government could long exist." Id.
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Justice Story stated in dicta that Christianity was part of the common law in
"this qualified sense, that its divine origin and truth are admitted, and
therefore it is not to be maliciously and openly reviled and blasphemed
against, to the annoyance of believers or the injury of the public."7 2
Therefore, "[iut is unnecessary for us .. .to consider what would be the
legal effect of a devise in Pennsylvania for the establishment of a school or
college, for the propagation of Judaism, or Deism, or any other form of
infidelity. Such a case is not to be presumed to exist in a Christian
country. 03
When Story, Kent, and Duncan declared that the exercise of true religion
was essential to good government, they meant true Protestant religion. In
the early nineteenth century, the religious sensibilities of Roman Catholics,74
Jews, Muslims, or other "impostors" were often not considered within the
penumbra of the rights of conscience. The law of blasphemy thus furthered
the goals of religious orthodoxy. However, in the period following the
demise of the last religious assessment, there was a noticeable shift in the
legal basis for blasphemy prosecutions. In the 1837 case Commonwealth v.
Kneeland,75 Chief Justice Shaw upheld a conviction for blasphemy, 76 but
narrowly construed the scope of the statute:
[U]nderstanding the statute against blasphemy as we do ... that it
is not intended to prevent or restrain the formation of any opinions
or the profession of any religious sentiments whatever, but to
restrain and punish acts which have a tendency to disturb the public
peace, it is not repugnant to, but entirely consistent with, [the State
constitutions'] Declaration of Rights.77
71. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844). Vidal involved a challenge to a will in which a bequest
was made to an institution for the poor on the condition that no clerics be allowed to teach at the
institution. The bequest was challenged on the ground that the anticleric proviso was unchristian
and unenforceable in a Christian country. Justice Story upheld the will on the grounds that non-
clerics were not prevented from teaching Christianity. Id. at 200-01.
72. Id. at 198 (emphasis added) (citing Updegraff v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394
(Pa. 1824)).
73. Id.
74. See infra part II.C (discussing anti-Catholicism in mid-19th century America).
75. 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 206 (1837) (Shaw, C.J.).
76. The defendant had written and published, "Universalists believe in a god which I do not;
but believe that their god, with all his moral attributes (aside from nature itself) is nothing more
than a mere chimera of their own imagination." Id. at 207. This was prosecuted under a state
statute prohibiting "any person [from] willfully blasphem[ing] the holy name of God, by denying,
cursing, or contumeliously reproaching God, his creation, government, or final judging of the
world." Id. at 213.
77. Id. at 221. According to Leonard Levy, Abner Kneeland "was the last man to be jailed
by Massachusetts for the crime of blasphemy." LEONARD LEVY, BLASPHEMY IN
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That same year, the Delaware Supreme Court expanded Kneeland's
distinction between religious-based blasphemy prosecutions and prosecutions
for "breach of the peace." In Delaware v. Chandler,78 the court canvassed
English blasphemy cases and concluded "[h]e therefore, who subverted,
reviled or ridiculed the religion of our English ancestors, was punished at
common law, not for his offense against God, but for his offense against
man, whose peace and safety as they believed was endangered by such
conduct. 79 Christianity was a part of the "common law" only to the extent
that it remained "the prevailing religion of the people."
80
If in Delaware the people should adopt the Jewish or Mahometan
religion, as they have an unquestionable right to do if they prefer
it, this court is bound to notice it as their religion, and to respect it
accordingly.8'
This interpretation departs from the principles underlying Story's
Commentaries and the decisions of Ruggles and Updegraph. To Joseph
Story and Chancellor Kent, the purpose of blasphemy laws was not limited
to protecting prevailing religious sensibilities. Such laws were intended to
entrench the Protestant-Christian faith which they believed was essential to
good government. Although Chandler cites Ruggles and Updegraph as
82precedent, the court clearly rejects the idea that Christianity is somehow an
inherent part of the common law:
It will be seen then that in our judgment by the constitution and
laws of Delaware, the [Clhristian religion is part of those laws, so
far [as blasphemy] is punishable, while the people prefer it as their
religion, and no longer. The moment they change it and adopt any
other, as they may do, the new religion becomes in the same sense,
a part of the law, for their courts are bound to yield it faith and
credit, and respect it as their religion. Thus, while we punish the
offense against society alone, we leave [C]hristianity to fight her
own battles .... 83
Kneeland and Chandler rejected religious-based interpretations of
blasphemy statutes as a matter of common law, not as an interpretation of
state or federal constitutions. But common law in the nineteenth century was
MASSACHUSETrS: FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AND THE ABNER KNEELAND CASE vii (Da Capo
Press 1973).
78. 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 553 (1837).
79. Id. at 557.
80. Id. at 562-63.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 577.
83. Id. at 572.
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informed by a variety of sources. Judges did not create common law.
Instead, its principles were "discovered" by judges as they explored legal
sources such as the Magna Charta and the Petition of Right. One potential
source was the federal Constitution; even if not binding upon the states, the
Bill of Rights could nevertheless be read as expressing certain fundamental
freedoms which ought not to be abridged by any government-state or
federal.
This reading of the Bill of Rights, of course, presumes an interpretation
that focuses not on federalism, but on the "rights retained by the people."
85
The Establishment Clause in particular would have to undergo an
interpretive transformation before it could be read as a limitation on state
power over religion. In fact, at the same time state courts were
reinterpreting their own law on matters of Church and State, they also
reinterpreted the federal Establishment Clause.
B. The Rhetorical Establishment Clause
1. Sunday Closing Laws
In the early decades of the nineteenth century, most states regulated
Sunday observance as a religious matter of civil importance.86 For example,
in the 1817 case Commonwealth v. Wolf,87 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
upheld the conviction of a man accused of violating the sanctity of the
Sabbath. The court based its decision on the need of civilized government to
have a populace "taught to revere the sanctity of an oath, and look to a
future state of rewards and punishments for the deeds of this life.",
88
Therefore, "[i]t is of the utmost moment ... that they should be reminded of
their religious duties at stated periods. 
8 9
By the 1840s, however, justifications for the enforcement of Sunday
Closing laws began to change. In City Council of Charleston v. Benjamin, 90
the South Carolina Court of Errors repeated the standard Christian
84. See Amar, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 7, at 1205.
85. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
86. This, in itself, was a shift from the purely religious rationales which had previously
justified such laws. See Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An
Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 915, 935 n.85 (1992).
87. 3 Serg. & Rawle 48 (Pa. 1817). For a general history of Sunday Closing laws, see
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 470-73 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion).
88. Wolf, 3 Serg. & Rawle at 50.
89. Id.
90. 21 S. C. Eq. (2 Strob. Eq.) 508 (1846).
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community rhetoric, but then went on to note that the law is not just a
religious law, it is "in a political and social point of view, a mere day of
rest. Its observance, as such, is a mere question of expediency." 9' That
same year, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court heard arguments which
criticized the religious-based rationale in Wolf as being out of step with
religious liberty under both the state and federal constitutions. In Specht v.
Commonwealth,92 the defense asked the court to overrule Wolf and hold that
civil government has no power over religion:
If the legislature can direct that religious observance, then there is
no limit to their power over religious subjects. If they can direct
the people to stay at home quietly, they can direct them to go to
church, and if they can direct them to attend church, they can
indicate the church to be attended. In short, if they have any
power over religious subjects, they have all power. Such power
would be a perfect union of church and state, so much abhorred by
the people of this republic. It would inevitably lead to religious
persecutions, and finally to civil and religious tyranny.
93
Then, after citing the religion clauses of the First Amendment:
I think I may safely say, that the constitutions of the United States
and of Pennsylvania are founded on no religion, but on purely civil
considerations-on the unalienable rights of man; one of which is
that man shall not interfere with the rights of conscience. 94
Although the court upheld the law as a mere civil regulation, 95 it
acknowledged that Wolf's rationale implicated "the unrestrained liberty of
91. Id. at 529.
92. 8 Pa. 312 (1848).
93. Id. at 315.
94. Id. at 317 (first emphasis added). According to the defense:
What else was it but the doctrine 'that the Christian religion was a part of the
law,' and to be enforced by the civil arm, that gave the Holy Inquisition such
horrid force, and placed the civil and religious liberty, and the lives of nations
of men, at the mercy of the bloodiest power that ever inflicted misery upon the
human race, in the name of Demons or of Gods!
Id. at 316. The defense argued that, because Sabbatarian merchants (in this case, Seventh Day
Baptists) were already compelled to close their shops on Saturday, the Sunday Closing law "'gives a
preference to other modes of worship.' It allows some six full days to labour, and restrains others
to five." Id. at 319 (emphasis in original).
95. Id. at 323. The court distinguished between a law based on religious doctrine, and a
regulation accommodating the religious beliefs of the majority:
All agree that to the well-being of society, periods of rest are absolutely
necessary .... In a Christian community, where a very large majority of the
people celebrate the first day of the week as their chosen period of rest from
labour, it is not surprising that that day should have received the legislative
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conscience guarant[e]ed by the constitution of the United States, and of the
several states of the confederacy, including our own." 96  Accordingly, the
Specht court rejected any language in Wolf which indicated that Christianity
has a special status under the law. Not only were "the Christian, the Jew,
the M[a]hammedan, and the Pagan" entitled to protection, but even "the
Infidel, who madly rejects all belief in a Divine Essence, may safely do so,
in reference to civil punishment, so long as he refrains from the wanton and
malicious proclamation of his opinions with intent to outrage the moral and
religious convictions of a community, the vast majority of whom are
Christians. 07
By the 1850s, the idea that civil penalties should not be meted out on
religious grounds appeared in a variety of state court decisions-many of98
them overruling prior cases. In the 1849 case Sellers v. Dugan, the
Supreme Court of Ohio held a contract void on the ground that it was made
on a Sunday in violation of state law prohibiting "common labor on
Sunday. "99  In dissent, Judge Caldwell declared that "[i]f the [state] can
punish an act of this kind, they can another, and their power to persecute, to
punish for whatever they may consider abstractly wrong, is unlimited. "1°° In
1853, Caldwell's belief that the state had no legitimate power over religion
prevailed. In Bloom v. Richards,1°1 the Ohio Supreme Court reversed itsholding in Sellers v. Dugan and declared "[n]either Christianity nor any
sanction: and as it is also devoted to religious observances, we are prepared to
estimate the reason why the statute should speak of it as the Lord's day, and
denominate the infraction of its legalized rest, a profanation. Yet this does not
change the character of the enactment. It is still, essentially, but a civil
regulation made for the government of man as a member of society, and
obedience to it may properly be enforced by penal sanctions. To say that one
of the objects of the legislature was to assert the sanctity of the particular day
selected, is to say nothing in proof of the unconstitutionality of the act, unless
in this the religious conscience of others has been offended and their rights
invaded.
Id.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Coulter rejected the rationale of the majority. Coulter would
have upheld the Act "because it guarded the Christian Sabbath from profanation, and, in the
language of the act, prohibited work or worldly employment on the Lord's Day, commonly called
Sunday; and not because of the mere usefulness of the day as a day of rest and cessation from
worldly labour." Id. at 327.
96. Id. at 322 (emphasis added).
97. Id.
98. 18 Ohio 489 (1849).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 496.
101. 2 Ohio St. 387 (1853) (holding that contracts entered into on Sunday are enforceable, but
upholding general Sunday Closing laws).
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other system of religion is a part of the law of this state." 12 According to
Judge Thurman, "[wie have no union of church and state, nor has our
government ever been vested with authority to enforce any religious
observance, simply because it is religious. Laws must be supported by
secular, not religious rationales:
[T]he statute upon which the defendant relies, prohibiting common
labor on the Sabbath, could not stand for a moment as a law of this
state, if its sole foundation was the [C]hristian duty of keeping that
day holy, and its sole motive to enforce the observance of that
duty. For no power over things merely spiritual, has ever been
delegated to the government, while any preference of one religion
over another, as the statute would give upon the above hypothesis,
is directly prohibited by the constitution. 104
In fact, the only case of this period to explicitly uphold a Sunday Closing
law on religious grounds, did so as a matter of free exercise. In State v.
Ambs,10 5 Judge Scott rejected the claim that the state's Sunday Closing law
interfered with the rights of conscience:
The Sunday law was not intended to compel people to go to
church, or to perform any religious act, as an expression of
preference for any particular creed or sect, but was designed to
coerce a cessation of labor, that those who conscientiously believed
that the day was set apart for the worship of God, might not be
disturbed in the performance of their religious duties . . . .Thus
the law, so far from affecting religious freedom, is a means by
which the rights of conscience are enjoyed.106
102. Id. at 387.
103. Id. at 391. Judge Thurman thus rejected the theory of religious "toleration": "We
sometimes hear it said that all religions are tolerated in Ohio; but the expression is not strictly
accurate-much less accurate is it to say, that one religion is a part of our law, and all others only
tolerated. It is not by mere toleration that every individual here is protected in his belief or
disbelief. He reposes not upon the leniency of government, or the liberality of any class or sect of
men, but upon his natural indefeasible rights of conscience, which, in the language of the
constitution, are beyond the control or interference of any human authority." Id. at 390-91.
104. Id. at 391 (emphasis added); see also STATE ASSEMBLY OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, ON THE PETITION PRAYING THE REPEAL OF THE LAWS FOR THE
OBSERVANCE OF THE SABBATH, 5 State of New York Assembly Docs., Doc. No. 262 (1838)
(rejecting the petition and construing such laws "merely as a civil institution" and not an enforced
observance of religious duty), quoted in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 498-500 (1961).
105. 20 Mo. 214 (1854).
106. Id. at 218.
1108 [Ariz. St. L.J.
ESTABLISHMENT CLA USE
By 1858, at least one court had struck down Sunday Closing laws as
establishing compulsory religious observance. In Ex parte Newman,'1 7 the
California Supreme Court held that the state's Sunday Closing law
"enforce[d], as a religious institution, the observance of a day held sacred by
the followers of one faith, and entirely disregarded by all the other
denominations within the State. , 108 According to the court, the act required
"a periodical cessation from ordinary pursuits, not as a civil duty necessary
for the repression of any existing evil, but in furtherance of the interests, and
in aid of the devotions of those who profess the Christian religion. "109 Over
the dissent of future United States Supreme Court Justice Stephen Field,
Chief Justice Terry declared:
When our liberties were acquired, our republican form of
government adopted, and our Constitution framed, we deemed that
we had attained not only toleration, but religious liberty in its
largest sense-a complete separation between Church and State,
and a (Perfect equality without distinction between all religious
sects. 1
Although the holding relied on the state constitution, Chief Justice Terry
saw no distinction between the rights expressed in the California and federal
constitutions. In support of his holding, Terry quoted "Mr. Johnson['s] . . .
celebrated Sunday-mail report," where Johnson declared:
Our Government . . . is a civil and not a religious institution ...
Let the National Legislature once perform an act which involves
the decision of a religious controversy, and it will have passed its
legitimate bounds.... Our Constitution recognizes no other power
than that of persuasion.
107. 9 Cal. 502 (1858). In Newman, a Jewish man was fined and imprisoned when he failed
to pay a fine for selling clothing on Sunday. The court held in favor of petitioner and issued writ of
habeas corpus. Id. at 504-05.
108. Id. at 506 (emphasis added).
109. Id. The court rejected as "mere assertions" the holdings in Specht v. Commonwealth and
City Council v. Benjamin that such laws establish "merely a civil rule, and make no discrimination
or preference in favor of any religion." Id.
110. Id. at 507.
111. Id. at 507-08. In his concurring opinion in the same case, Justice Burnett declared:
Under the Constitution of this State, the Legislature cannot pass any act, the
legitimate effect of which is forcibly to establish any merely religious truth, or
enforce any merely religious observances. The Legislature has no power over
such a subject. When, therefore, the citizen is sought to be compelled by the
Legislature to do any affirmative religious act, or to refrain from doing
anything, because it violates simply a religious principle or observance, the Act
is unconstitutional.
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By 1861, the two justices who voted to strike down the Sunday Closing
law had been replaced and the Supreme Court of California had a new chief
justice-the formerly dissenting Justice Field. When the California
Legislature passed a new Sunday Closing law, the Field court did not
disagree with the principle of "no power over religion," but upheld the new
law as a civil regulation that simply ensured a day of rest." 2 That the law
happened to coincide with the religious observance of the majority of the
population was irrelevant. 113
That same year, the New York Court of Appeals also upheld a Sunday
Closing law as a civil regulation.1 4 Although the court declined to overrule
Ruggles' statement that Christianity was part of the common law, the
statement was carefully explained:
Christianity is not the legal religion of the State, as established by
law. If it were, it would be a civil or political institution, which it
is not; but this is not inconsistent with the idea that it is in fact, and
ever has been, the religion of the people. This fact is every where
[sic] prominent in all our civil and political history, and has been,
from the first, recognized and acted upon by the people, as well as
by constitutional conventions, by legislatures and by courts of
justice. 115
By distinguishing between the religion of the people and the law of state,
courts could uphold laws that provided special protections to the Christian
Sabbath while at the same time distancing themselves from the Ruggles idea
that civil power could be exercised on religious grounds.1 6  Nor was this
Id. at 515.
112. See Exparte Andrews, 18 Cal. 679, 685 (1861) ("The operation of the act is secular, just
as much as the business on which the act bears is secular; it enjoins nothing that is not secular, and
it commands nothing that is religion; it is purely a civil regulation, and spends its whole force upon
matters of civil economy."). The court did not address the Newman court's more general point that
the state and federal constitutions rejected "toleration" and embraced "separation."
113. Id. at 684 ("While the primary object of legislation, which respects secular affairs, is not
the promotion of religion, yet it can be no objection to laws, that while they are immediately aimed
at secular interests, they also promote piety." (citing, as examples, "acts of incorporation of
churches, exemption from taxation . . . , protection of meetings from interruption, and the like
acts.")).
114. Lindenmuller v. People, 33 Barb. 548 (N.Y. 1861).
115. Id. at 561 (emphasis added). In this way, the law's recognition of Christianity meant that
the legislature could act to "secure to the community the privilege of undisturbed worship." Id. at
657.
116. See, e.g., Zeisweiss v. James, 63 Pa. 465, 471 (1870). In Zeisweiss, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania held that the law could not recognize a devise for the creation of the "Infidel
Society of Pennsylvania" on the grounds that the law would not incorporate such a society. The
court cited Updegraph and Vidal and then noted:
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trend limited to Sunday Closing laws. From 1840 to 1860, a variety of
claims challenged the notion that the law of the land was based on
Christianity. One by one, laws once based on religious principles were
reconstrued to conform to the idea that the civil state has no power over the
subject of religion.
2. The Church Property Cases
In the 1813 English case, Craigdallie v. Aiknan, 117 Chancellor Lord
Eldon ruled that church property was held in trust for the persons who had
contributed money for the original acquisition of the church. Developing
this principle in the later case Attorney-General ex rel. Mander v.
Pearson, Lord Eldon declared that church property was held in trust for
the propagation of certain religious doctrines and that it was the duty of the
court to award the property to the faction adhering to the traditional
doctrines of the church. The so-called "Pearson Rule" was soon adopted in
the new world by way of state common law.
119
Although application of the Pearson Rule required detailed examination
of church doctrine, such inquiries fit well in a world where courts routinely
decided issues of blasphemy and proper deportment on the Sabbath."'
It is unnecessary here to discuss the question under what limitations the
principle is to be admitted that Christianity is part of the common law of
Pennsylvania. . . . It is in entire consistency with this sacred guarantee of the
rights of conscience and religious liberty to hold that, even if Christianity is no
part of the law of the land, it is the popular religion of the country, an insult to
which would be indictable as directly tending to disturb the public peace. The
laws and institutions of the state are built on the foundation of reverence for
Christianity. To this extent, at least, it must certainly be considered as well as
settled that the religion revealed in the Bible is not to be openly reviled,
ridiculed or blasphemed, to the annoyance of sincere believers who compose
the great mass of the good people of the Commonwealth.
Id. (citing Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394 (Pa. 1824) and Vidal v. Girard's
Executors, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844)).
117. 1 Dow. 1, 3 Eng. Rep. 601 (H.L. 1813) (Scot.).
118. 3 Mer. 353, 418-19, 36 Eng. Rep. 135, 156-57 (Ch. 1817).
119. See, e.g., Bowden v. M'Leod, 1 Edw. Ch. 588, 592 (N.Y. Ch. 1833) ("where a
religious society is formed, a place of worship provided, and either by the will of the founder, the
deed of the trust through which the title is held or by the charter of incorporation, a particular
doctrine is to be preached in the place and the latter is to be devoted to such particular doctrines and
service. In such a case, it is not within the power of the trustees of the congregation to depart from
what is thus declared to be the object of the foundation or original formation of the institution and
teach new doctrines and set up a new mode of worship there"); see also Wilson v. Presbyterian
Church of John's Island, 19 S.C. Eq. (2 Rich. Eq.) 192 (1846).
120. In the case of Kniskern v. Lutheran Churches of St. John and St. Peter, 1 Sand. Ch. 439
(N.Y. Ch. 1844), the court considered whether adherence to the Augsburg Confession is an
essential characteristic of a Lutheran Congregation. The court concluded that it was. Id. at 558.
ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J.
However, just as theological rationales grew less routine in blasphemy cases,
so the Pearson Rule came under fire as a remnant of "establishment
England." By the 1840s, litigants on the side of doctrinal innovation began
to cite both the state and federal constitutions for the principle that the state
had no power-and the courts no jurisdiction-to interfere in matters
involving religious doctrine and church government.
As early as 1842, Kentucky courts had rejected the Pearson Rule, noting
that "[tihe judicial eye of the civil authority of this land of religious liberty,
cannot penetrate the veil of the Church, nor can the arm of this Court either
rend or touch that veil for the forbidden purpose of vindicating the alleged
wrongs of the exscinded members." 121 In the 1845 case Miller v. Gable,
122
litigants cited both the New York constitution and the "Const. U.S.
Amendment, art. 1" for the proposition that "the trustees of a religious
corporation in this country have the sole charge and management of the
temporalities, and the courts cannot interfere with their acts on account of
In order to allow some doctrinal evolution in churches, some state courts modified the Rule and
made it applicable only when there had been a "fundamental doctrinal departure." See, e.g., Miller
v. Gable, 2 Denio 492, 548 (N.Y. 1845) ("Between that extreme which confers all power upon the
congregation or the trustees, and the doctrine which subjects the property to forfeiture for
departures from doctrine or forms of government, in matters not indispensable to the great ends to
be obtained by religious organization, there is a wide interval where we may take our stand
sustained by the law and by a sober and enlightened public sentiment."); Trustees of the Lutheran
Congregation of Pine Hill v. St. Michael's Evangelical Church, 48 Pa. 20, 21 (1864) (changing
from one synod to another within a general denomination does not constitute a fundamental
departure from doctrine). See generally, William G. Ross, The Need for an Exclusive and Uniform
Application of "Neutral Principles" in the Adjudication of Church Property Disputes, 32 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 263 (1987).
121. Shannon v. Frost, 42 Ky. (3 B. Mon.) 253, 259 (1842); see also, Ferarria v.
Vasconcelles, 23 Ill. 456, 460-61 (1860) (citing same language from Frost); McBride v. Porter, 17
Iowa 203, 206 (1864) ("Under our form of government, there is a complete severance of the church
from the State; and in this State we have constitutional provisions inhibiting the legislature and the
courts from interfering with the rights of parties on account of their opinions on the subject of
religion."); German Reformed Church v. Seibert, 3 Barr. 282, 291 (Pa. 1846) ("Any other than
[ecclesiastical courts] must be incompetent judges of matters of faith, discipline and doctrine; and
civil courts, if they should be so unwise as to attempt to supervise their judgments on matters which
come within their jurisdiction, would only involve themselves in a sea of uncertainty and doubt,
which would do anything but improve either religion or good morals.").
Similar thoughts were occurring to judges in the slaveholding states. According to the South
Carolina Supreme Court in 1843, "lilt belongs not to the civil power to enter into or review the
proceedings of a Spiritual Court. The structure of our government has for the preservation of Civil
Liberty, rescued the Temporal Institutions from religious interference. On the other hand, it has
secured Religious liberty from the invasion of the Civil Authority." Harmon v. Dreher, 17 S.C. Eq.
(Speers Eq.) 87 (1843). Unfortunately, South Carolina, like the other slaveholding states, was in
the process of regulating all but the most pro-slavery forms of Christianity. See infra part III.
122. 2 Denio 492 (N.Y. 1845).
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any departure from the faith of the founders." 123 In the same paragraph, the
parties distinguished British case law on the ground that, in England, there is
an "established church. , 124 Although Miller applied a modified form of the
Pearson rule, 125 five years later the New York courts rejected the idea that
the state had any power to decide matters of religious doctrine:
Those to whom was intrusted [sic] the establishment of our free
governments in this new world, knew the calamitous effects of the
struggle between the sceptre and the crosier in the old; and
resolved that there should be perfect liberty of conscience here. In
this spirit our constitutions were framed and our laws enacted, and
heresy became unknown to our criminal code. . . .It follows, that
there is no power in the state, legislative, executive or judicial, that
can interfere with this complete religious liberty. 1
26
One by one, state courts rejected the Pearson Rule as violating the
"liberty of conscience" and "separation of church and state." 127 In 1846, the
Vermont Supreme Court noted that "[t]he situation of our country, our
constitutional provisions in relation to religious freedom, forbid, that the
authority of [the Pearson Rule] should here be recognized." 128 Similarly, in
1869 the Missouri Supreme Court declared "[i]n this country, there is a total
disconnection between the church and state, and neither will interfere with
123. Id. at 536.
124. Id.
125. See supra notes 117-18.
126. Robertson v. Bullions, 9 Barb. 64, 106-07 (N.Y. App. Div. 1850) (emphasis added); see
also id. at 104 ("The church establishment of England, from which country we derive the great
body of our laws, occupies a great space there; and has not and never can have any representative
here. ").
127. See Shannon v. Frost, 42 Ky. (3 B. Mon.) 253 (1842); Harmon v. Dreher, 17 S.C. Eq.
(Speers Eq.) 87 (1843); Robertson, 9 Barb. 64; Bellport v. Tooker, 29 Barb. 256 (N.Y. App. Div.
1859); McGinnis v. Watson, 41 Pa. 9 (1861); McBride v. Porter, 17 Iowa 203 (1864); Missouri ex
rel. Watson v. Farris, 45 Mo. 183 (1869); see also Bernard Roberts, Note, The Common Law
Sovereignty of Religious Laufinders and the Free Exercise Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 211, 223 (1991).
Similarly, in Ferraria v. Vasconcelles, 23 I1. 456, 462-63 (1860), the court appears to apply the
departure from doctrine rule and awards the church property to the minority faction that has
remained loyal to the mother church. However, in doing so, the court articulates a principle of
hierarchical autonomy:
The object of the donations of money, the purchase of the property and the
erection of the church edifice, was to afford a place of worship according to the
usages and principles of the body as then organized, and not according to the
usages of some other body. When the defendants and their party withdrew
from the church, and refused to recognize its authority, they abandoned all
right to the use of the property as an independent body or organization.
Id. at 462. Thus, the church hierarchy is allowed to decide who is a current member of the church
and entitled to its use.
128. Smith v. Nelson, 18 Vt. 510, 555 (1846).
27:10851 1113
ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J.
the other when acting within their appropriate spheres." 129 According to the
Illinois Supreme Court, "[flreedom of religious profession and worship
cannot be maintained if the civil courts trench upon the domains of the
church-construe its canons and rules-dictate its discipline and regulate its
trials." 130  Case law which seemed to apply the Pearson Rule was dismissed
as a remnant of prior state religious establishments and out of step with
modem notions of religious liberty. 131 All of the decisions rejecting the
Pearson Rule ultimately relied on state common, statutory, and constitutional
law.i3 Four years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
United States Supreme Court rejected the Pearson Rule as a matter of
federal common law.
3. Watson v. Jones
Immediately following the Civil War, the General Assembly of the
Presbyterian Church of the United States ("PCUS") adopted a resolution that
required new members who had previously advocated the divine nature of
slavery to "repent and forsake these sins" before being allowed to join the
church.113  Enforcing this resolution tore apart the Walnut Street
129. Watson v. Farris, 45 Mo. at 198.
130. Chase v. Cheney, 19 Am. Law Reg. 295, 304 (I11. 1871).
131. See, e.g., Robertson, 9 Barb. at 117 ("The cases in Massachusetts and Connecticut give
but little light on the subject, owing to the peculiarity of the semi-established systems under which
they arose."); Chase, 19 Am. Law Reg. at 306 (noting the contrary decisions in Massachusetts, but
attributing them to the state religious establishment which existed in that state from 1780 to 1833).
132. New Hampshire was one of the few--if not the only-northern state during this period to
continue to follow the Pearson Rule. In Hale v. Everett, 53 N.H. 9 (1868), a split New Hampshire
Supreme Court awarded church property to the faction most loyal to the Protestant doctrines of the
original church charter. In doing so, the majority cited Story's Commentaries for the proposition
that "power over the subject of religion is left exclusively to the state governments." Id. at 124. In
his dissenting opinion, the future Chief Justice of the New Hampshire Supreme Court, Charles Doe,
rejected the assertion made in cases like Ruggles, Updegraph, and Vidal that Christianity was part
of the common law. According to Judge Doe,
[UIntil church and state shall be united, [this] assertion will continue to be a
sounding and deceitful phrase, -a mere rhetorical expression, unintelligible in
law and untrue in fact. . . . "Toleration," said Chief Justice Smith, "came to
be considered a duty. With us it is exploded, for it implies an establishment
which we have not. Here the doctrine of toleration has given place to the most
perfect equality of rights."
Id. at 210-11 (quoting Muzzy v. Wilkins, 1 Smith 133 (N.H. 1803)).
133. For a discussion of the background to the Watson case, see Arlin M. Adams & William
R. Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf: Church Autonomy and the Religious Clauses of the First Amendment,
128 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (1980); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT
ARE 182-84 (1987). In the 1868 church property case Gartin v. Penick, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 110
(1868), the Kentucky Court of Appeals awarded the church property to the Presbyterian faction that
refused to follow the General Assembly's resolution. The court declared that the resolution not only
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Presbyterian Church of Louisville, Kentucky. 134 Claiming that the
requirement violated the Presbyterian Constitution, a majority of the local
church trustees and a minority of the congregation seized control of the
Walnut Street Church and attempted to sever the Church's ties with PCUS.
The General Assembly promptly declared the local pro-Union members to be
the "true" Walnut Street Church and proceeded to appoint new trustees.
Both factions claimed control of the Church property and the dispute landed
in state court. 135  The Kentucky Supreme Court rejected the idea that the
dispute involved a "question purely ecclesiastical, to be settled by the synod
itself and the general assembly,"1 36 and held that the General Assembly had
departed from its own laws when it installed the new trustees.1 37 The losing
violated the original doctrines of the Presbyterian church, it also violated the separation of church
and state. See id. at 127-30. In fact, the resolution "signalized the Assembly as an intermeddling
and revolutionary partisan in an unconstitutional, unholy, and bloody work of abolition by armies,
and even servile war and insurrection." Id. at 130. The Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals
dissented:
[Wihen the jurisdiction of the civil courts over the church constitutions and
organizations, as civil contracts, is once firmly fixed, there will be but few
questions, immediately or remotely affecting individual rights in church
property . . . that may not . . . be reviewed by the civil courts, and thus the
independence of church courts will be destroyed, [and] the freedom of the
church from the State becomes a mere myth.
Id. at 152, quoted in HOWE, supra note 12, at 79.
134. Watson v. Avery, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 332 (1867).
135. Id. at 343-44.
136. Id. at 348. According to the court:
Such a construction of the powers of church tribunals would, in our opinion,
subject all individual and property rights, confided or dedicated to the use of
religious organizations, to the arbitrary will of those who may constitute their
judicatories and representative bodies, without regard to any of the regulations
or constitutional restraints by which, according to the principles and objects of
such organizations, it was intended that said individual and property rights
should be protected.
Id. This decision appears to conflict with prior cases decided by the Kentucky Supreme Court. See
id. at 376-78 (Williams, J., dissenting) (citing both Shannon v. Frost, 42 Ky. (3 B. Mon.) 253
(1842), in which the court refused to apply the departure from doctrine theory in a congregational
church dispute, and Gibson v Armstrong, 46 Ky. (7 B. Mon.) 481 (1847), in which the court
indicated that, when in doubt, it should defer to the church tribunals.).
137. According to the court:
[W]e are of the opinion that the said order of the Synod, directing said election
of additional ruling elders in said church, was contrary to the constitution of
the Presbyterian Church, and not obligatory upon the session and congregation
of said Walnut Street Church; and said Avery, McNaughton, and Leech, not
having been elected as ruling elders according to the laws and regulations of the
church, were not thereby constituted ruling elders, nor were they so constituted
by said declaration of the general assembly.
Id. at 362.
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pro-Union faction then sought relief in federal court, 138 and the case
eventually made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court.
In Watson v. Jones,139 the Supreme Court declared that in the United
States "[t]he right to organize voluntary religious associations . . . and to
create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith . .. is
unquestioned." 140  This right would be "totally subverted" if secular courts
were given the power to reverse the decisions of ecclesiastical tribunals.' 14
Therefore, "[i]t is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their right
to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves,
that those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical
cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism itself provides
for."142 Finally, the Court rejected the "departure from doctrine" approach
of Pearson as an appropriate principle of federal common law:
In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious
belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any religious
doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality and property,
and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all.
The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no
dogma, the establishment of no sect. 143
Although Watson was decided on grounds of federal common law,144 the
rationale had broader implications. The Court in Watson refused to give
effect to the state court's determination that the elders who prevailed in the
Supreme Court were not elders at all. Justice Miller attempted to gloss over
this conflict with the Kentucky courts by holding that the elders who
prevailed in state court had since removed themselves from the governance
of the PCUS.145 Whether they had a right to remove themselves along with
the church property, of course, was the essence of the dispute. 6  In
essence, the Supreme Court reversed a decision in the same case by the
138. The circuit court accepted diversity jurisdiction. See Adams & Hanlon, supra note 133,
at 1298.
139. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
140. Id. at 728-29.
141. Id. at 729.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 728.
144. The Supreme Court would later characterize the opinion as "informed by First
Amendment considerations." Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445 (1969).
145. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 734.
146. See also HOWE, supra note 12, at 80-81 ("In truth, the Supreme Court's exercise of
jurisdiction in the case of Watson v. Jones was extraordinary-perhaps even outrageous.").
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state's highest court, and did so in order to vindicate the people's "right to
establish tribunals for the decision of [religious] questions."1
47
4. Summary
By the 1860s, state courts for the most part had disentangled blasphemy
and Sabbath laws from their religious origins. Likewise, church property
disputes were no longer decided on the basis of a departure from religious
doctrine. Each of these developments was accompanied by declarations that
"liberty of conscience" includes freedom from state-imposed religious
orthodoxy. On the other hand, the evolving principle of nonestablishment
was not understood to prevent the state from deferring to the religious
sentiments of the community. Prosecutions for breach of the peace, for
example, might depend upon the religious sensibilities of the community.
Likewise, the day chosen as the day of rest would depend on which day most
people chose to go to church. These deferences to public sentiment were not
considered exercises of power over the subject of religion because,
supposedly, the state did not care which day was chosen or which religious
beliefs were held by the community. 148
Although laws remained on the books and prosecutions were upheld, in
the context of the mid-19th century this shift in the basis for the law was
nothing short of radical. By assuming an agnostic stance, the state had
abandoned its role as guardian of the borders of religious orthodoxy. Civil
government was no longer officially concerned with which-if any-
religious beliefs were held by the people. This marks a clear departure from
the Religious Republican sensibilities that dominated at the Founding. 
149
Remarkably, the rise of the principle of nonestablishment occurred in an
extraordinarily religious age. The so-called Second Great Awakening of the
early nineteenth century sparked a dramatic increase in religious fervor and
147. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 729 (emphasis added).
148. An example of this at the federal level can be found in the 1854 debate over legislative
chaplains. Recommending against the abolishment of congressional chaplains, the Senate Judiciary
Report articulated what would become the dominant trend in the states: agnostic accommodation of
religious sentiment. According to Senator George Badger:
The chaplain is an officer of the house which chooses him, and nothing more.
He owes his place not to his belonging to a particular religious society, or
holding a particular faith, but to the voluntary choice of the members of the
house, and stands, in this respect, upon the same footing with any other officer
so elected.
S. REP. No. 376, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1853).
149. See Tushnet, supra note 12, at 228 (most of the framers thought religion was an essential
element in the defense of virtue, without which the republic could not long survive); see also Lash,
supra note 56, at 1118.
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church attendance.15 0 As tens of thousands were attending religious revivals
along the western frontier, 151 hundreds of religious reform movements were
organizing in the east. 152 One explanation for the rise of the
nonestablishment principle during such a period may be the fragmentation of
Protestant denominations and the incentive of religious minorities to put a
nonestablishment spin on the "no power" Establishment Clause. 153  This
alone, however, seems inadequate to explain why such a religious age
embraced a provision originally intended to protect state churches, and
reinterpreted it to forbid the union of Church and State. Perhaps at least
part of the explanation lies with one of the most significant religious conflicts
of the nineteenth century: the clash between the Protestant majority and the
influx of Roman Catholic immigrants.
C. Anti-Catholicism and the Nonestablishment Principle
In 1834, Samuel Morse published a series of letters that claimed that the
monarchies of Europe had conspired with the Catholic Church to subvert the
spread of democracy by sending Catholic immigrants to take control of the
American West. 154  In 1835, the abolitionist Lyman Beecher published A
Plea for the West which, in addition to echoing the concerns of Morse,
150. See SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 415
(1972).
151. Id. at 432. The Cane Ridge revival of 1801 near Lexington, Kentucky is estimated to
have attracted a crowd of ten to twenty-five thousand people. Id. at 433.
152. The Second Great Awakening resulted in the rapid growth of religious-based movements
against gambling, drinking, horse racing, dueling, swearing, Sabbath breaking, and, most
explosively, slavery. See Lash, supra note 56, at 1131; GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 335 (1991).
153. This appears to have happened in the debates over the tax assessments in the New
England states. As the anti-assessment movement in Massachusetts gained momentum, the Baptist
Christian Watchman declared:
No government nor any religious sect has the power of toleration in the
accurate or strict sense of the word, and that all governments ought to be so
constructed and administered as to render its exercise unnecessary. This
principle is thoroughly recognized in the Constitution of the United States and
ought to be so in all the Constitutions of each State.
Christian Watchman, Nov. 16, 1832, at 182, quoted in 2 McLOUGHLIN, supra note 30, at 1255.
Similarly, in Connecticut, Baptist Elder Asahel Morse, in an address to the Republican Party,
maintained that "lilt is much more to be desired that the constitution and statutes of every state were
strictly conformable in all ecclesiastical affairs to the federal constitution." MCLOUGHLIN, supra
note 61, at 1007.
154. SAMUEL F. B. MORSE, FOREIGN CONSPIRACY AGAINST THE LIBERTIES OF THE UNITED
STATES (New York, 1835). Morse believed that the Leopold Association, founded in Vienna in
1829, ran the operation to finance the building of Catholic churches in America. TYLER
ANBINDER, NATIVISM AND SLAVERY 9 (1992).
1118 [Ariz. St. L.J.
27:1085] ESTABLISHMENT CLA USE 1119
warned against the influence of Catholic schools on American children. 155
Maria Monk had a runaway best seller with her Awful Disclosures of the
Hotel Dieu Nunnery of Montreal which described illicit convent sexual
practices. 156
As the polemic spread, so did anti-Catholic violence. The same year
Morse published his letters, a mob burned the Ursile convent in
Charlestown, Massachusetts after a rumor had started that a nun was being
imprisoned.15 7 In the 1840s, anti-Catholic riots in Philadelphia left Catholic
homes burned, churches destroyed, and several people dead. 158  In the
1850s, on what came to be known as "Bloody Monday," anti-Catholic
rioting in Louisville left twenty people dead, three quarters of them
"foreigners," and hundreds wounded. 159
Nativists, and their representatives in the notoriously anti-Catholic Know-
Nothing Party, 16°  linked Catholicism to slavery, 
16  drunkenness, 162
155. A. JAMES REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 185 (1985) ("The Catholic
Church holds now in darkness and bondage nearly half the civilized world. . . .It is the most
skilled, powerful, dreadful system of corruption to those who wield it, and of slavery and
debasement to those who live under it.") (quoting Lyman Beecher); see also 1 STOKES, supra note
24, at 826.
156. No other book in America sold more copies until the publication of Uncle Tom's Cabin.
ANBINDER, supra note 154, at 9.
157. Id.
158. 1 STOKES, supra note 24, at 830.
159. JAMES J. HENNESEY, AMERICAN CATHOLICS: A HISTORY OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC
COMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES 125 (1981).
160. See ANBINDER, supra note 154, at 12.
161. According to a typical Know-Nothing resolution from Norfolk, Virginia:
Roman Catholicism and slavery being alike founded and supported on the basis
of ignorance and tyranny; and being, therefore, natural allies in every warfare
against liberty and enlightenment; therefore, be it Resolved, That there can
exist no real hostility to Roman Catholicism which does not embrace slavery,
its natural co-worker in opposition to freedom and republican institutions.
Reprinted in HENNESEY, supra note 159, at 145. Although Pope Gregory XVI condemned the
slave trade in 1838, no Catholic Bishop in America supported abolition prior to the Civil War.
REICHLEY, supra note 155, at 184. Another reason Catholics were generally regarded by
abolitionists as being "soft" on slavery was the fact that Catholics were predominantly
Democratic-the party arguing in favor of the expansion of slavery. See Robert P. Swierenga,
Ethnoreligious Political Behavior in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: Voting, Values, Cultures, in
RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS: FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE 1980s (Mark A. Noll
ed., 1990).
162. According to the editors of the Cleveland Leader, "[Irish Catholics are] sots and bums
who crawled out of the 'rotten nests of filth' on election days to cast 'ignorant' ballots for the
candidates of the 'slaveocracy.'" These "'cattle' lured to the polls by huge quantities of whisky,
worshipped the three deities of the Ruffian Party-the Pope, a whisky barrel, and a nigger driver."
Swierenga, supra note 161, at 159 n.63. Catholics were also blamed for blocking attempts by the
growing Temperance Movement to pass prohibition bills. ANBINDER, supra note 154, at 43-44.
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monarchy,1 63 sexual immorality, 164 and the union of Church and State. 165
States passed laws preventing Bishops from holding property and barring
from public office anyone who owed allegiance to any "foreign prince,
power, or potentate" (the Nativist catchwords for Roman Catholic). 166 More
than anything else, however, Roman Catholicism was viewed as threatening
the existence of the new public school system. 167
1. The Bible and Public Education
The English Bible, in some way or other, has, ever since the
settlement of Cambridge, been read in its public schools, by
children of every denomination; but in the year 1851, the ignorant
immigrants, who have found food and shelter in this land of
freedom and plenty, made free and plentiful through the influence
of these very Scriptures, presume to dictate to us, and refuse to let
their children read as ours do, always have done, the Word of Life.
The arrogance, not to say impudence, of this conduct, must startle
163. ANBINDER, supra note 154, at 119 (According to the Ohio President of the Know-
Nothing Party, Thomas Spooner, "That the natural and constant tendencies of Romanism, are
Monarchical, and of Protestantism, Republican, the history of both faiths abundantly proves.").
164. No doubt in response to publications like Ms. Monk's, the Nativist Know-Nothing Party
in Maryland and Massachusetts became convinced that nunneries were the setting for sexual
misconduct by Catholic Priests. Accordingly, they set up committees to inspect the convents.
ANBINDER, supra note 154, at 137.
165. An 1832 encyclical letter of Pope Gregory described the liberty of conscience as an
"absurd and erroneous doctrine." BRADLEY, supra note 11, at 124-25. In 1864, Pope Pius IX
issued his "Syllabus of Errors," which included, among other "errors," "[tihe Church has not the
power of using force, nor has she any temporal power, direct or indirect." 2 STOKES, supra note
24, at 393. The result of such pronouncements, despite claims to the contrary by American catholic
leaders, was to encourage the view that Roman Catholics in America were attempting to join the
powers of Church and State. See id. at 394-95.
166. According to the Massachusetts Constitution of 1855:
Resistance to the aggressive policy and corrupting tendencies of the Roman
Catholic Church in our country by the advancement of all political stations-
executive, legislative, judicial or diplomatic-of those only who do not hold
civil allegiance, directly or indirectly, to any foreign power, whether civil or
ecclesiastical, and who are Americans by birth, education and training, thus
fulfilling the maxim "Americans only shall govern America."
See generally ANBINDER, supra note 154, at 141.
167. When Catholics raised their voices against the reading of the King James Bible in the
common schools, Protestants responded that this was an attempt to destroy the Protestant public
school system and leave nothing but Catholic parochial schools. Thus, Catholic dissent was
denounced as an attempt by the "black brigade of the Catholic Priesthood" to "form an
ecclesiastical kingdom of God within the Republic." Harold M. Helfman, The Cincinnati "Bible
War," 1869-1870, 60 OHIO ST. ARCHAEOLOGICAL & HIST. Q. 369, 379 (1951) (quoting AMORY
D. MAYO, RELIGION IN THE COMMON SCHOOLS: THREE LECTURES DELIVERED IN THE CITY OF
CINCINNATI 23, 28 (1869).
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every native citizen, and we cannot but hope that they will
immediately take measures to teach these deluded aliens, that their
poverty and ignorance in their own country arose mainly from their
ignorance of the Bible. 16
8
Religious Republicanism emphasized the development of man's moral
nature; not only was virtue necessary for good government, it also led to
material success and social well-being. 169 In 1787, the Northwest Ordinance
declared "[rieligion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good
government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of
education shall forever be encouraged." 170  The Ordinance expressed the
commonly held view that "effective moral instruction must be based upon
and vitalized by religion." 171  The Bible was the proper source of such
instruction because it contained the "best code of moral instruction known to
man." 172  Thus, it is no surprise that the rapidly growing number of state-
supported "common schools" 173 invariably began their day with devotional
services including Bible reading, prayer, and the singing of hymns.
174
168. Editorial, 14 COMMON SCH. J., Jan. 1, 1852, at 9, reprinted in Thomas James, Rights of
Conscience and State School Systems in Nineteenth-Century America, in TOWARD A USEABLE PAST:
LIBERTY UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS 126-27 (Paul Finkelman & Stephen E. Gottlieb eds.,
1991).
169. Michael Les Benedict, Victorian Moralism and Civil Liberty in the Nineteenth-Century
United States, in THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND AMERICAN LIFE: CRITICAL ASPECTS OF THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY EXPERIENCE 91, 99 (Donald G. Nieman ed., 1992).
170. The Northwest Ordinance (1787), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL & LEGAL HISTORY 85, 88 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1989). The Ordinance
became the model for state constitutions adopted during the first half of the nineteenth century. See
1 STOKES, supra note 24, at 480. Interestingly, although the Ordinance appears to imply agency
over the subject of religion, it too came to be interpreted otherwise. See infra note 191 and
accompanying text. As mentioned earlier, the Ordinance involves territorial policy-a matter
closely aligned to prerogatives of states.
171. Ohio Teacher's Association - Proceedings, 29 OHIO EDUC. MONTHLY 257-58 (1870),
quoted in Bernard Mandel, Religion and the Public Schools of Ohio, 58 OHIO ST.
ARCHAEOLOGICAL & HIST. Q. 185, 188-89 (1949).
172. William Slocomb, School Government, 19 OHIO EDUC. MONTHLY 2 (1868), quoted in
Mandel, supra note 171, at 188-89.
173. See Benedict, supra note 169, at 99-100. In 1647, Massachusetts created "the first
system of public education in the American colonies." See 2 STOKES, supra note 24, at 50.
Although rooted in the New England states, especially colonial Massachusetts, the movement
towards free "common schooling" did not gain momentum in other states until the 1830s. See G.
Alan Tarr, Church and State in the States, 64 WASH. L. REV. 73, 89 (1989).
174. Mandel, supra note 171, at 187. In 1820, school teachers in Providence, Rhode Island
were encouraged "to impress on the minds of the scholars a sense of the Being & Providence of
God & their obligations to love & reverence Him, . . . [and] the observance of the Sabbath as a
sacred institution." BRADLEY, supra note 11, at 128. Instruction in religion was also common in
orphanages, poorhouses, asylums, prisons, and reformatories. Benedict, supra note 169, at 105.
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Horace Mann, the Massachusetts Unitarian and public school advocate,
was adamant about the prohibition of sectarian doctrine in the new common
schools.1 75 By sectarian, however, Mann was referring to doctrines peculiar
to one or more Protestant sects. Thus, the "non-sectarian" version of the
Bible to be read in schools was the Protestant King James, not the Roman
Catholic Douay Bible.176  Unlike the King James, the Douay version
includes the collection of books known as the "Apocrypha" and is annotated
to provide the official Church interpretation of the text. Accordingly, when
the Massachusetts public schools followed Horace Mann's advice that the
Bible be read "without note or comment," this was as much a prohibition on
the Roman Catholic way of reading the Bible as it was a provision intended
to avoid Protestant sectarian strife. 177
2. The Catholic Challenge
Large masses of foreign population are among us, weak in the
midst of our strength. Mere citizenship is of no avail, unless they
175. According to Mann:
[I]f a man is taxed to support a school, where religious doctrines are inculcated
which he believes to be false, and which he believes that God condemns, then
he is excluded from the school by divine law, at the same time that he is
compelled to support it by human law. This is a double wrong.
HORACE MANN, ANNUAL REPORT (1845-48), quoted in 2 STOKES, supra note 24, at 57.
176. See id. "Our system earnestly inculcates all Christian morals; it founds its morals on the
basis of religion, it welcomes the religion of the Bible; and in receiving the Bible, it allows it to do
what it is allowed to do in no other system,-to speak for itself." Id.
Protestant materials in the public schools went beyond the Bible. One early 19th century public
school textbook included the following math problem:
Fifteen Christians and 15 Turks bound at sea in one ship in a terrible storm,
and the pilot declaring a necessity of casting one half of these persons into the
sea, that the rest might be saved, they all agreed that the persons to be cast
away should be set out by lot in this manner, viz., the 30 persons should be
placed in a round form like a ring and then, beginning to count at one of the
passengers and proceeding regularly every ninth person should be cast into the
sea until of the 30 persons there remained only 15. The question is, how these
30 persons ought to be placed that the lot might fall infallibly upon the 15
Turks, and not upon any of the 15 Christians.
PAUL BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS: THE GREAT CONTROVERSY 15 (1963).
177. See Spiller v. Woburn, 94 Mass. 127, 129 (1866) (affirming the expulsion of a Catholic
student for refusing to bow her head during the morning Bible reading in compliance with state law
that required the daily reading of the Bible "without note or oral comment"). Protestants, of
course, rejected the idea that the scriptures had to be "officially interpreted." For example, Baptist
Elias Smith declared that Christians were "wholly free to examine for [themselves] what is truth,
without being bound to a catechism, creed, confession of faith, discipline or rule excepting the
scriptures." ELIAS SMITH, THE LOVING KINDNESS OF GOD DISPLAYED IN THE TRIUMPH OF
REPUBLICANISM IN AMERICA 27 (1809), reprinted in GORDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 332 (1991).
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imbibe the liberal spirit of our laws and institutions, unless they
become citizens in fact as well as in name. In no other way can
the process of assimilation be so readily and thoroughly
accomplished as through the medium of the public schools, which
are alike open to the children of the rich and the poor, of the
stranger and the citizen.1
78
The social transformations of the nineteenth century exacerbated the
conflict brewing in the public schools. The period between 1830 and 1860
witnessed a massive migration of immigrants from Western Europe, many of
whom did not share the Protestant views of Horace Mann. In 1800, there
were about 50,000 Catholics in the United States. In the 1840s, fleeing the
starvation brought on by the infamous potato blight, 2,000,000 Irish left their
home country. Nearly three quarters of that number arrived in the United
States, and 90% of these were Catholic. 179 By 1850, the Roman Catholic
Church was the largest church in America.
As early as 1829, Catholic bishops had begun to encourage local
churches to build their own parochial schools. By 1840, over two hundred
such schools had been established,' many of them supported by the same
public funds that supported the common schools. 181 By the 1850s, however,
states began to amend their constitutions to declare that "no religious or
other sect, or sects, shall ever have any exclusive right to, or control of, any
part of the school funds of this state. ,182 Political organizations like the
Know-Nothing Party were devoted to staunching the flow of immigrants and
battling the Catholic challenge to Protestant hegemony in the public schools.
For example, the 1856 election platform of the Know-Nothing Party
promoted:
The education of the youth of our country in schools provided
by the State, which schools shall be common to all, without
178. Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379, 413 (1854) (upholding the school board's decision to
expel a Roman Catholic student for refusing to participate in Protestant religious exercises).
179. ANBINDER, supra note 154, at 6-7. Between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 people died of
starvation or starvation-related illness during the blight. Id. at 6.
180. MARTIN E. MARTY, PILGRIMS IN THEIR OWN LAND: 500 YEARS OF RELIGION IN
AMERICA 27 (1984).
181. 2 STOKES, supra note 24, at 57.
182. OHIO CONST. art. V1, § 2 (1851). According to Anson P. Stokes, "[flrom 1844 on, all
states amending their constitutions, and new states when admitted to the Union (except West
Virginia, which later corrected the omission), decreed in their fundamental laws against any
diversion of public funds to denominational purposes." 4 STOKES, supra note 33, at 271. Stokes
fails to note here, or in his three volume treatise CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES
(1950), the role anti-Catholicism played in the passage of these laws, reading them instead as pro-
separationist statutes. See, e.g., 4 STOKES, supra note 33, at 271.
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distinction of creed or party, and free from any influence or
direction of a denominational or partisan character.
And, inasmuch as Christianity, by the Constitutions of nearly
all the States; by the decisions of most eminent judicial authorities,
and by the consent of the people of America, is considered an
element of our political system, and the Holy Bible is at once the
source of Christianity and the depository and fountain of all civil
and religious freedom, we oppose every attempt to exclude it from
the schools thus established in the States.
183
Catholic protests that Bible reading violated their rights of conscience fell
on deaf ears.184 In 1859, eleven year old Thomas Wall of Boston followed
the advice of his priest and refused to recite a prayer or read from the
Protestant King James Bible during morning exercises in the public school.
After Wall's teacher beat his hands with a rattan stick for thirty minutes,
Wall submitted. The Boston Police Court upheld the beating on the ground
that "[o]ur schools are the granite foundation on which our republican
government rests." 185  Granting Wall an exemption would lead to similar
claims by other denominations and result in a "war upon the Bible and its
use in the common schools."1
8 6
Some Catholic leaders sought to resolve the impasse by calling for
separate but equal common schools: Allow both Protestants and Catholics to
run their own schools supported by the same common school fund. 187 The
183. Reprinted in 2 STOKES, supra note 24, at 67-68.
184. See Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379 (1854) (rejecting a Catholic student's claim to be
exempt from required reading of the King James Bible).
185. H. Frank Way, The Death of the Christian Nation: The Judiciary and Church-State
Relations, 29 J. OF CHURCH & STATE 509, 519 (1987) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cook, 7 Am. L.
R. 417 (1859)).
186. Id.
187. See JAMES CARDINAL GIBBONS, DISCOURSES AND SERMONS ON THE SECTIONAL CRISIS,
1830-1865, 87 (David B. Cresebrough ed., 1991) ("a discerning and fair-minded American people,
... will, I trust, one day recognize and exercise the sacred duty of giving us equitable share in the
public school fund"). The so-called "Poughkeepsie Plan", advocated by Archbishop Ireland of St.
Paul, would have allowed each religion to have its own schools that were supported and inspected
by the state, but the teachers would have been of the religion's own denomination. 2 STOKES,
supra note 24, at 361. In 1839, New York Governor William Seward, after learning that Catholic
parents kept their children out of school because teachers used the Protestant King James Bible,
proposed that a portion of the common school funds be devoted to the formation of parochial
schools. In these schools, immigrants could be "instructed by teachers speaking the same language
with themselves and professing the same faith." See ANBINDER, supra note 154, at 10. At the last
minute Seward amended his proposal to allow each city ward to elect its own school commissioner
who would then determine the ward's school curricula. The result was the election of
commissioners who "almost uniformly required reading of the King James Bible." Id. at 11. In
1842, the New York Legislature prohibited public funding of any school in which "any religious
sectarian doctrine or tenet shall be taught, inculcated, or practiced." See G. Alan Tarr, Church and
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attempts failed in a whirlwind of anti-Catholic legislation and constitutional
amendments that prohibited "religious sects" from receiving public school
funds. 188 The prohibition on the use of public funds in sectarian institutions
had the effect of freezing out Catholics from an equal share of education
funds, while simultaneously establishing Protestantism as the sole doctrine
taught in public schools. If the ban caused parochial schools to close for
lack of funding and thus forced Catholic students into the Protestant common
schools, so much the better. 1
89
By the 1860s, it was clear that anti-Catholicism would thwart any attempt
at equal time or equal funds. To the Roman Catholic leadership, the only
way out of the impasse was to call for the removal of all religious instruction
from the classroom. Citing recent case law in the areas of blasphemy,
Sunday Closing laws, church property disputes, as well as recent
interpretations of state and federal constitutions, Catholics argued that civil
government had no power over the subject of religion: The Bible must be
removed from the public schools.
3. Minor v. Board of Education of Cincinnati
In response to Catholic complaints, the 1869 Cincinnati School Board
prohibited all religious instruction and Bible reading in the city's public
schools. Newspapers throughout the United States denounced the school
board's action and warned that the "Bible exclusion movement" was a
product of "priestly craft and cunning" and was aimed at disrupting the
entire public school system. 19 A group of Cincinnati residents immediately
State in the States, 64 WASH. L. REV. 73, 92 (1989) (quoting V. LANNIE, PUBLIC MONEY AND
PAROCHIAL EDUCATION: BISHOP HUGHES, GOVERNOR SEWARD, AND THE NEW YORK SCHOOL
CONTROVERSY 233 (1968)). This law prevented any attempts by the New York City Assembly to
permit funding for Catholic parochial schools in districts where Catholics were a majority. The
Supreme Court recently cited the New York experience as an example of that state's historical
rejection of specially designated and funded school districts for religious minorities. See Kiryas Joel
v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2491 (1994). There was no hint of irony in the citation.
188. See 4 STOKES, supra note 33, at 271. During this same period, the federal government
barred land grants to sectarian schools. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 100 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Douglas Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in
Religious Liberty, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 841, 845 (1992); Tarr, supra note 173, at 94.
189. After the Massachusetts Legislature passed a law requiring daily reading of the King
James Bible in the public schools, it approved an amendment to the state constitution which barred
the use of state funds for sectarian schools. "This, Know Nothings hoped, would make parochial
schools financially unfeasible, forcing the children of Catholics to learn 'American' customs in the
public schools." ANBINDER, supra note 154, at 136.
190. "Deacon Dick" Smith, editor of the Cincinnati Gazette (Sept. 1869), reprinted in,
Helfman, supra note 167, at 374. Other newspapers criticizing the Board's action included,
Cleveland Leader, Philadelphia Bulletin, Baltimore American, Buffalo Express, New York Sun,
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applied to the superior court of Cincinnati for a restraining order against the
enforcement of the new regulation. 191
The plaintiffs argued that Christianity was a part of the common law of
the state and that no government could survive absent state-supported
religion. 19  For support, the plaintiffs cited Chancellor Kent's opinion in
People v. Ruggles and Story's Commentaries. 193 The lawyers for the School
Board in turn argued that state law did not and could not recognize
religion. 194 Citing recent opinions from other states on blasphemy, Sunday
Closing, and church property disputes, lawyers for the School Board
maintained that the courts could not require religious exercises on the
grounds that to do so would constitute a "law respecting the establishment of
religion. ",
9 5
Despite their disagreement on the merits, both sides agreed that a major
issue in the case was whether the state had power over the subject of
religion. According to plaintiffs' lawyer William Ramsey, Ohio's
constitutional protection of religious freedom "and its counterpart in the
Federal Constitution" had been erroneously construed as "the declaration of
the utter indifference of the State to all religion. " 196  Ramsey rejectedJefferson's separationist views and instead cited provisions from various state
Toledo Commercial, Dayton Journal, Washington Chronicle, Albany Journal, and Philadelphia
Press. See Helfman, supra note 167, at 380 nn.38-39.
191. See Robert G. McCloskey, Introduction to THE BIBLE IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CINCINNATI IN THE CASE OF MINOR V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION OF CINCINNATI xi (Da Capo Press 1967) (1870) [hereinafter BIBLE IN THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS]. The lawyers involved in the case were an astonishing assemblage and reflected the
importance of the controversy. For the plaintiffs were William R. Ramsey, a prominent member of
the Cincinnati bar, George R. Sage, later a federal district judge, and Rufus King, grandson of the
statesman who had signed the Constitution, former student of Joseph Story at Harvard Law School,
and then Dean of the Cincinnati Law School. For the defendants were Johann B. Stallo, later
appointed by President Cleveland as minister to Italy, George Hoadley, professor at Cincinnati Law
School and future Governor of Ohio, and Stanley Matthews, future United States Senator and
Supreme Court Justice. Id.
192. Id. at 44-46 (argument of W. R. Ramsey) (citing Story, Rawle, and Kent's sections on
religious liberty for the proposition that the law is not "indifferent" to religion).
193. Id. at 44-45 (argument of W. R. Ramsey) and 158-59 (argument of George R. Sage).
194. Id. at 125 (argument of George Hoadley) ("We have no union of Church and State, nor
has our government ever been vested with authority to enforce any religious observance, simply
because it is religious.") (quoting Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 387, 388 (1853)).
195. Id. at 259 (argument of Stanley Matthews) (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE
ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (lst ed. 1868)); id. at 125-26 (argument of George Hoadley)
(citing Bloom and other recent state court decisions for the proposition that "no power is possessed
by the Legislature over things spiritual, but only over things temporal").
196. Id. at 41.
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constitutions which invoked God and promoted religion and piety.197
Although worded differently, "it is apparent that they intend the same
thing-protection to the various forms of religious belief, and thereby the
encouragement and promotion of religion." 198  To Ramsey, all such
provisions reflected the vision of the federal Establishment Clause:
I do not care to make a further reference to the various state
conditions. They are uniform in substance, though various in
form, and they are well illustrated by the commentary of Judge
Story upon the similar provision of the Constitution of the United
States: "The real object of the amendment was not to countenance
much less advance Mohammedanism, or Judaism, or Infidelity, by
prostrating Christianity, but to exclude all rivalry among Christian
sects, and to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment,
which should give to a hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the
national government." 199
Note that Ramsey does not cite Joseph Story's statement that the
Establishment Clause leaves the states free to regulate religion. 20 Nor does
201he quote Madison or Jefferson to the same effect. In fact, the plaintiffs
completely ignored the originally federalist nature of the Establishment
Clause. Instead, they assumed that the federal Establishment Clause
expressed some kind of "nonestablishment" value, a value which informed
the content of "counterpart" provisions in state constitutions. 202  For
example, plaintiffs' lawyer George Sage argued that there "is nothing in all
this which tends to the establishment of church and state," and cited recent
197. Id. at 41-44.
198. Id. at 44.
199. Id. at 44-45. Article I, section 7 of the Ohio Constitution, to which Ramsey was
referring, states:
All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God
according to the dictates of their own conscience. No person shall be
compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or maintain any
form of worship, against his consent; and no preference shall be given, by law,
to any religious society; nor shall any interference with the rights of conscience
be permitted. No religious test shall be required, as a qualification for office,
nor shall any person be incompetent to be a witness on account of his religious
belief ....
Id. at 40.
200. See STORY, supra note 30, at 702-03 ("Thus the whole power over the subject of religion
is left exclusively to the state governments, to be acted upon according to their own sense of justice,
and the state constitutions.").
201. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
202. BIBLE IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 191, at 44-45. In fact, Ramsey goes on to
cite Rawle and Chancellor Kent's interpretation of the federal religion clauses in support of his
interpretation of Ohio law. Id. at 45-46.
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congressional debates over the federal Establishment Clause in support of his
argument. 20 3 Even though it would be in their interests to do so, none of the
plaintiffs' lawyers interpreted the federal Establishment Clause to reserve
power over religion to the states. Indeed, no one made any distinction
between the substantive content of the federal Establishment Clause and the
vastly different religion clauses of the Ohio, or any other state,
constitution. 
204
The trial court held for the plaintiffs and instructed the school board to
resume religious exercises in the public schools. 205  In reaching his
conclusion, Judge Hagans noted that "[i]t is one of the glories of our country
that we have no religious establishments: and our experience has not only
demonstrated the wisdom and justice of these principles, but the success of
our example is being felt all over the world. Thus far, this section of the Bill
of Rights has in view the safety, security, happiness, and freedom of the
conscience of, the individual citizen."20 6 Nevertheless, religion and the state
207
necessarily were connected in the State- constitution, and the school board
had wrongly "cut off the instrumentality by which those essentials to good
government are cultivated."
20 8
In dissent, Judge Alphonso Taft characterized the reading of the
Protestant Bible as a sectarian religious exercise. Citing Cooley's statement
that no state may pass any law "respecting an establishment of religion,"
Taft declared:
203. Id at 200.
204. Interestingly, counsel for the defendants pointed out that the First Amendment "does not
prevent, was not designed to prevent, the States from creating church establishments." Id. at 144
(remarks of George Hoadley) (emphasis in original). As a historical matter, Hoadley is correct; the
First Amendment was not "designed" to be applied against the states. Hoadley apparently did not
consider the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified the year before, to be applicable. Other scholars have
addressed the issue of "silence" surrounding the incorporation of the Bill of Rights. See Amar,
Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 7, at 1246. For the purposes of this paper, however, it is
irrelevant. I hope only to show that the Establishment Clause is as capable of incorporation as any
other clause in the original Bill of Rights. In other words, nonestablishment was considered a right
of all citizens. On this point, Hoadley clearly believed that separation of Church and State was
required in order to protect the "liberty of conscience."
205. Id. at 370 ("Our common schools cannot be secularized under the Constitution of Ohio.
It is a serious question whether as a matter of policy merely, it would not be better that they were,
rather than offend conscience. With this, however, we have now nothing to do.") (Hagans, J.,
opinion).
206. Id. at 359 (emphasis in original).
207. The Ohio Constitution provided "religion, morality, and knowledge ...being essential
to good government, it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to pass suitable laws . . . to
encourage schools and the means of instruction." OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7 (1851).
208. BIBLE IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 191, at 369. Judge Storer concurred with the
judgment of Judge Hagans in an opinion which passionately defended the Bible as the revealed word
of God and the root of all true systems of morals. Id. at 381-82.
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This great principle of equality in the enjoyment of religious
liberty, and the faithful preservation of rights of each individual
conscience is important in itself, and is essential to religious peace
and temporal prosperity, in any country under a free government.
But in a city and State whose people have been drawn from the
four quarters of the world, with a great diversity of inherited
religious opinions, it is indispensable.
209
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio agreed with Taft and rejected
Judge Hagan's notion that the law and religion were connected in any
way. 210  According to Judge Welsh, "[l]egal Christianity is a solecism, a
contradiction of terms." 211 "Religion is not-much less is Christianity or
any other particular system of religion-named in the preamble to the
Constitution of the United States as one of the declared objects of
government. " 2 12  Although the Ohio Constitution mentions religion as
essential to good government, this did not mean that government was
essential for religion. 21 3 Instead, religion was best secured by adopting "the
'hands off doctrine"':
Let the state not only keep its own hands off, but let it also see to it
that religious sects keep their hands off each other. Let religious
doctrines have a fair field, and a free, intellectual, moral and
spiritual conflict. The weakest-that is, the intellectually, morally
and spiritually weakest-will go to the wall, and the best will
triumph in the end. This is the golden truth which it has taken the
world eighteen centuries to learn, and which has at last solved the
terrible enigma of "church and state. "
214
Judge Welsh believed that the Ohio Constitution embraced this
215doctrine, and that the principles themselves "are as old as Madison, and
were his favorite opinions. Welsh then completes his argument by
quoting Madison's letter to Governor Livingston: "I observe with particular
pleasure the view that you have taken of the immunity of religion from civil
209. Id. at 417 (Taft, J., dissenting).
210. Board of Educ. v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211, 246 (1872).
211. Id. at 248; see also id. at 246-47 ("We are told that this word 'religion' must mean
'Christian religion,' because 'Christianity is a part of the common law of this country,' lying behind
and above its constitutions. Those who make this claim can hardly be serious.").
212. Id. at 248 (emphasis added).
213. Id. Welsh thus reads the Northwest Ordinance and its Ohio counterpart as neither
containing nor implying governmental power over the subject of religion.
214. Id. at 250-51.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 253.
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government, in every case where it does not trespass on private rights or the
public peace.,
2 17
4. Summary
The fight over the Bible in the public schools would continue long after
Cincinnati v. Minor was decided. 218 What is significant, for the purposes of
this article, is the dynamic created by the controversy between the Protestant
majority and the Catholic minority. Rejecting Roman Catholicism as a threat
to (Protestant) democracy, Protestants called for "no aid" to sectarian
institutions on the ground of "separation of church and state." Catholics,
dismayed by coerced Protestant religious instruction in the public schools,
also called for "separation" and the abolishment of compelled instruction in
the King James Bible. Both groups sought to use the federal constitution's
norm of "no power" as a rhetorical tool in their fights-fights which most
often took place on a state level. Finally, this "mixing up" of state and
federal constitutions had the result of obscuring the federalist origins of the
Establishment Clause and engrafting upon the Clause a statement of personal
liberty: freedom from religion. This helps to explain how "no power"
rhetoric could flourish in a world where the majority of people still believed
that religious faith was crucial to a well-functioning democracy.
Perhaps most significantly, the Cincinnati case reveals the rhetorical
impact of a "no power" Establishment Clause. Both sides in the Cincinnati
case assumed that the federal Establishment Clause expressed a
nonestablishment principle, and that this principle was analogous to similar
provisions in all state constitutions. Accordingly, a lot was at stake
depending on whether the Clause stood for nonestablishment, or simply
"nonsectarianism." Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court followed the lead
of state court decisions on blasphemy, Sunday Closing laws, and church
property, and embraced an interpretation of the Establishment Clause that
211stood for personal "immunity" from state establishment of religion.
217. Id. at 254 (quoting James Madison to Governor Livingston (July 10, 1822)). After
having generated so much excitement when the trial began, the opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court
that allowed the Board to drop religious exercises created no controversy at all; it received little
newspaper attention. Helfman, supra note 167, at 386. In the municipal elections of April 1870,
five of the eight board members who voted to exclude the Bible won reelection. Id.
218. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schemmp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (holding that daily Bible
readings in the public schools violate the incorporated Establishment Clause).
219. In an earlier article, I stated my belief that by the early 19th century, it was clear that the
federal government would play a role in the promotion of general religion. See Lash, supra note
56, at 1119 (citing among other things, support of missionaries and the Second Great Awakening).
I still believe this was the case for the first 30-40 years of the 19th century. Although I now believe
that nonestablishment principles were ascendant by Reconstruction, this coincided with a general
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Protestants who decried the Catholic Church's joining of Church and State
now found themselves hoist by their own petard.
D. The "Put God in the Constitution" Movement
Perceiving the subtle and persevering attempts which are made to
prohibit the reading of the Bible in our Public Schools, to
overthrow our Sabbath laws, to corrupt the family, to abolish the
Oath, Prayer in our National and State Legislatures, Days of
Fasting and Thanksgiving, and other Christian features of our
institutions, and so to divorce the American Government from all
connection with the Christian religion . . . a written Constitution
ought to contain explicit evidence of the Christian character and
purpose of the nation which frames it.
220
Those who continued to believe that Protestant Christianity was the state
religion chafed against the drum roll of decisions to the contrary. Faced
with the inexorable divorce of Christianity from the law of the land, religious
Republican groups focused their attention on the federal Constitution and the
rhetorical effect of its failure to acknowledge the providence of the Christian
view that the religious voice played a major role in the formation of public policy. Indeed, the
distinction courts made in the areas of Sunday Closing and blasphemy were predicated on such a
view. In this way, the rise of nonestablishment does not undermine my general point that the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment would have assumed that the concerns of religion and
government could legitimately overlap.
In fact, I now believe that the transformation of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be understood
apart from the transformation of the Establishment Clause. In my Free Exercise article I noted that
Religious Republicanism, as exemplified by laws against polygamy, removed a doctrinal barrier to
the embrace of religious exemptions in that it rejected Madisonian strict separation. I did not
explain, however, how the duty to protect the religion of the majority was transformed into the duty
to protect the religious exercise of the individual. See id. at 1130. I believe now that a crucial
missing piece of the puzzle was the evolving idea that, although the government could promote
morality as informed by religious sensibilities, it could not pass a religious-based law without
violating the norm of "no power." Interesting in this regard is the choice of the Congress to
remove the reference to Christianity in the polygamy law's preamble on the grounds that it contains
"what should not be inserted in a law." See id. at 1125 n.80.
If anything, understanding the reinterpretation of the Establishment Clause makes the case for
free exercise exemptions all the more plausible. Free exercise under religious establishments
amounted to no more than "religious toleration"-a pro-majoritarian doctrine that is unlikely to
have called for religious exemptions for dissenting religious groups. Free Exercise could not exist
as an independent norm until nonestablishment removes the idea that free exercise is dependent on
the "toleration" of the majority. Finally, if nonestablishment norms prohibit laws directly targeting
religion for support or suppression, that "frees up" the Free Exercise Clause to apply to burdens on
religion not covered by the Establishment Clause: burdens imposed by generally applicable law.
220. Constitution of the National Reform Association, 1864, reprinted in 2 STOKES, supra
note 24, at 260.
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God.221  In 1864, a group calling itself the National Reform Association
formally petitioned Congress to adopt the following amendment to the
Constitution:
We the people of the United States, humbly acknowledging
Almighty God as the source of all authority and power in civil
government, the Lord Jesus Christ as the Ruler among the nations,
and His revealed will as the supreme law of the land, in order to
constitute a Christian government ... do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America.222
In 1874, the Congress referred the matter to the Committee on the
Judiciary which recommended the petition be rejected:
[The Founders] in full realization of the dangers which the union
between church and state had imposed upon so many nations of the
Old World, [decided] with great unanimity that it was inexpedient
to put anything into the Constitution or frame of government which
might be construed to be a reference to any religious creed or
doctrine. 2
221. The complaint about the Constitution's failure to acknowledge God goes as far back as
the Founding. See 3 STOKES, supra note 24, at 582 (Letter of William Williams to Oliver
Ellsworth). The movement for national recognition of the Deity gained momentum during the crisis
of the Civil War. In 1861, the Secretary of the Treasury, Samuel Chase, sent the Director of the
Mint the following message: "Dear Sir: No nation can be strong except in the strength of God, or
safe except in His defense. The trust of our people in God should be declared on our national coins.
You will cause a devise to be prepared without unnecessary delay with a motto expressing in the
fewest and tersest words possible this national recognition." DAVID K. WATSON, HISTORY OF
AMERICAN COINAGE 214 (1899). In 1863, the Director of the Mint wrote in his annual report:
I would respectfully and earnestly ask the attention of the Department to the
proposition in my former report, to introduce a motto upon our coins
expressive of a National reliance on Divine protection, and a distinct and
unequivocal National recognition of the Divine Sovereignty. We claim to be a
Christian Nation-why should we not vindicate our character by honoring the
God of Nations in the exercise of our political Sovereignty as a Nation? . . .
'Tis an hour of National peril and danger-an hour when man's strength is
weakness-when our strength and our nation's strength and salvation, must be
in the God of Battles and of Nations. Let us reverently acknowledge his
sovereignty, and let our coinage declare our trust in God.
Quoted in 3 STOKES, supra note 24, at 602. In 1864, the motto "In God We Trust" appeared for
the first time on American coins. By Act of Congress in 1865, the Secretary of the Treasury was
authorized to add these words upon all current and future coins. Id. at 602. There are no recorded
debates in Congress regarding the passage of the Act. Whatever else Congress may have believed
about the motto, they explicitly rejected attempts to make Christianity a part of the nation's organic
law. See infra this section.
222. 3 STOKES, supra note 24, at 584-85 (emphasis in original).
223. Id. at 588. Referring to the same movement, and writing three years after the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment, Supreme Court Justice Bradley wrote:
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The Founders had been anything but unanimous about the dangers of a
union between church and state and had not intended to express any such
nonestablishment value. However, by Reconstruction, northern state courts
had translated the prohibition of the original Establishment Clause to be an
expression of fundamental religious liberty. So complete was the
reinterpretation of the Establishment Clause that its language-sui generis at
the Founding-now began to appear in the organic law of the states. For
example, the Iowa Constitution of 1857 declared: "The General Assembly
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. ,
224
I have never been able to see the necessity or expediency of the movement for
obtaining such an amendment. The Constitution was evidently framed and
adopted by the people of the United States with the fixed determination to
allow absolute religious freedom and equality, and to avoid all appearance even
of a State religion, or a State endorsement of any particular creed or religious
sect . . . . And after the Constitution in its original form was adopted, the
people made haste to secure an amendment that Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
This shows the earnest desire of our Revolutionary fathers that religion should
be left to the free and voluntary action of the people themselves. I do not
regard it as manifesting any hostility to religion, but as showing a fixed
determination to leave the people entirely free on the subject.
Religion, as the basis and support of civil government, must reside, not in
the written Constitution, but in the people themselves. And we cannot legislate
religion into the people. It must be infused by gentler and wiser methods.
MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH P. BRADLEY 357-59 (1901), quoted in Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 257-58 n.23 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
224. IOWA CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 3, reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 552,
552-53 (Ben. Perley Poore ed., 2d ed. 1878) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS];
see also CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF DESERET [Utah], art. VIII, § 3 (1849), reprinted in 9
SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 375, 380 (William F. Swindler
ed., 1979) [hereinafter SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS] ("All men shall have a natural and inalienable
right to worship God according to the dictates of their own consciences, and the General Assembly
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or of prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.") (Utah's draft constitution of 1860 contained essentially the same provisions, including the
language of the federal constitution); CONST. OF JEFFERSON TERRITORY, art. 1, § 3 (1859),
reprinted in 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra, at 18 ("The General Assembly shall make no
laws respecting an establishment of religion, nor shall any religious test be required of any citizen;
neither shall anyone be required to support any sect or denomination."). Other state constitutions
tracked the general approach of the federal constitution, though without the peculiar "respecting"
language of the federal Establishment Clause. See ALABAMA CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 3 ("That
no religion shall be established by law . . . ."); SOUTH CAROLINA CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 2 ("No
form of religion shall be established by law.");
Note that the Georgia Constitution of 1798 stated, "No one religious society shall ever be
established in the State, in preference to another." GEORGIA CONST. of 1798, art. IV, § 10. This
clause was removed in the 1865 constitution, as was the provision protecting the rights of
conscience. The Rights of Conscience provision was restored in the constitution of 1868.
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As adopted by the states, formally or otherwise, the reinterpreted
Establishment Clause retained its original "dual nature," if in modified form.
Recall that the original Establishment Clause had both a prohibitive and a
protective aspect; it was intended to both prohibit establishments at the
federal level while at the same time protecting establishments at the state
level. Similarly, the .principle of nonestablishment, which was by
Reconstruction generally thought to inform the Clause, also had a prohibitive
and a protective aspect; no government could legitimately prefer (prohibit)
one religion over another or attempt to suppress (protect) religious exercise
on religious grounds. According to Thomas Cooley in his "Treatise on
Constitutional Limitations" (1868):
The legislatures have not been left at liberty to effect a union of
Church and State, or to establish preferences by law in favor of
any one religious denomination or mode of worship. There is not
religious liberty where any one sect is favored by the State and
given an advantage by law over other sects. Whatever establishes
a distinction against one class or sect is, to the extent to which the
distinction operates unfavorably, a persecution; and, if based on
religious grounds, is religious persecution. It is not toleration
which is established in our system, but religious equality.
2 5
Cooley thus sees "nonestablishment" as a dual protection: it is as much an
"establishment" to make a distinction against "one class or sect" as it is to
make a distinction in favor of one class or sect. Today, we think of
establishment as government support of religion. In the mid-nineteenth
century, however, government suppression of "heretical beliefs," forced
religious observance of the Lord's Day, interference with church decisions
involving their own doctrine and government, or forced participation in
public school religious exercises were all "establishment" issues. According
to an 1853 Senate Committee Report on congressional chaplains:
225. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 469 (1st ed.
1868). Although Cooley believed that official recognition of the general religious sentiment of the
community was permissible, id. at 471, he rejected Story's view that the common law admitted the
"divine origin and truth" of Christianity, id. at 467. According to Cooley, the general belief was
that the state should "leave questions of religious belief and religious worship to be questions
between every man and his Maker, which human tribunals are not to take cognizance of, so long as
public order is not disturbed." Id. Cooley, however, was not entirely consistent. For example, he
rested his argument in favor of laws against public profanity on "the natural impulses of every man
who believes in a Supreme Being, and recognizes his right to our reverence." Id. at 476.
Nevertheless, Cooley agreed with the general trend of the common law away from religious
justifications for Sunday Closing laws, blasphemy, and church property disputes. Id. at 476-78.
1134 [Ariz. St. L.J.
ESTABLISHMENT CLA USE
If Congress has passed, or should pass, any law which, fairly
construed, has in any degree introduced, or should attempt to
introduce, in favor of any church, or ecclesiastical association, or
system of religious faith, all or any one of these obnoxious
particulars-endowment at the public expense, peculiar privileges
to its members, or disadvantages or penalties upon those who
should reject its doctrines or belong to other communions-such
law would be a 'law respecting an establishment of religion,' and
226therefore in violation of the constitution.
In this way, the Establishment Clause came to represent a personal
freedom. Over time, popular interpretation of the Clause focused not on the
principle of federalism, but on the principle of "nonestablishment." By
Reconstruction, the common interpretation of the Establishment Clause and
its "counterparts" in the states was that no government had any legitimate
power over religion as religion: the state could neither establish a preferred
religion, nor could it visit "disadvantages or penalties" upon disfavored
religious beliefs. Citizens by right were immune from such religious-based
persecutions.
E. Nonestablishment Implications for the Incorporation of the Establishment
Clause
Recall that the main objection to the incorporation of the Establishment
Clause is that the Clause was intended to express a principle of states' rights.
Thus, it makes no more sense to incorporate this clause against the states
than it does the Tenth Amendment. If, on the other hand, the Clause was
understood to express a principle of personal freedom-the principle of
nonestablishment-this is a freedom that can just as easily be applied against
the states as the federal government: no government (state or federal) has
any legitimate power over religion as religion. A "new" interpretation,
however, does not in itself alter the fact that the original Clause stood for
federalism, not personal freedom. If by Reconstruction most people
interpreted the Establishment Clause to express the principle of
nonestablishment, perhaps this merely illustrates how wrong people can be
about the Constitution. As a matter of originalism, one might argue, that
popular misunderstanding cannot change the original meaning of the
Clause .227
If the focus of the inquiry was the "original meaning of the First
Amendment," the objection has some force. Post-adoption interpretation has
226. S. REP. No. 376, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1853) (emphasis added).
227. See SMITH, supra note 12, at 51.
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but limited value, especially as the Founding recedes ever farther into the
past. However, we are not seeking the original meaning of the
Establishment Clause. Instead the endeavor is to determine the meaning of
the incorporated Establishment Clause. This shifts the focus from the
Founding to Reconstruction and the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. If the people intended this Amendment to embrace the
principle of nonestablishment, then the fact that they were "wrong" about the
228
original Establishment Clause is irrelevant. Put another way, nothing
prevents the people from reinterpreting the principle underlying the words of
the Establishment Clause and incorporating this principle-as expressed by
those words-into the Fourteenth Amendment.
229
But what possible reason is there to believe the drafters of the Fourteenth
Amendment gave a second thought to nonestablishment principles? Wasn't
the immediate task at hand the protection of black civil rights in the South?
What does this have to do with religion? As it turns out, quite a bit.
III. THE SOUTH AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. The South
Following secession, the Confederacy adopted its own constitution.
Modeled on the federal Constitution, one of the few changes was in the
preamble:
We the people of the Confederate States, each State acting in its
sovereign and independent character, in order to form a permanent
federal government, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility
and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity-
invoking the favor and guidance of Almighty God-do ordain and
230
establish this Constitution of the Confederate States of America.
228. Steven Smith raises the possibility that the "enactors of the Fourteenth Amendment might
have intended to incorporate the original meaning of the religion clauses, whatever that original
meaning was." SMITH, supra note 12, at 51. Thus, even if there was no longer a conceptual
barrier to incorporation of the religion clauses, the "intended meaning" of that incorporation
remains ambiguous. Id. Since Smith agrees with me that the original Establishment Clause
contained no substantive content, then it seems he would also agree that it would be impossible for
the members of the 39th Congress to have intended to incorporate the original meaning of the
Clause. Because incorporation assumes "substantive content," that possibility is foreclosed.
229. This approach follows Akhil Amar's insight that the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment was more about the incorporation of "principles" than it was about the incorporation of
"words." See Akhil R. Amar, In Praise of Babbitt, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1703, 1706 (1994).
230. THE CONFEDERATE CONSTITUTION, preamble, reprinted in UROFSKY, supra note 170, at
449 (emphasis added).
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The explicit invocation of Almighty God in the organic charter of the civil
government preserved the general approach of the slave-holding states. By
1860, the South had erected the most comprehensive religious establishment
to exist on American soil since Massachusetts Bay.
1. Southern Regulation of Religion
The slave master may withhold education and the Bible; he may
forbid religious instruction, and access to public worship. He may
enforce upon the slave and his family a religious worship and a
religious teaching which he disapproves. In all this, as completely
as in secular matters, he is "entirely subject to the will of a master,
to whom he belongs." The claim of chattelhood extends to the soul
as well as to the body, for the body cannot be otherwise held and
controlled. There is no other religious despotism on the face of the
earth so absolute, so irresponsible, so soul-crushing as this.23'
Fearing religiously inspired insurrection-particularly after the 1831 slave
revolt led by the Reverend Nat Turner 232-southern states enacted a
constellation of laws that strictly controlled religious exercise. Black
religious assemblies were heavily regulated; 233  slaves were not permitted
their own ministers, nor could they worship without the presence of a white
234
man.
231. WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: ITS
DISTINCTIVE FEATURES SHOWN BY ITS STATUTES, JUDICIAL DECISIONS, AND ILLUSTRATIVE
FACTS 254-55 (1968) (1853).
232. For an account of the Turner revolt, see 1 WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO
DISUNION 1776-1854, 178-81 (1990). For a general discussion of laws that directly and indirectly
abridged religious exercise in the South, see Lash, supra note 56, at 1134-36.
233. In the District of Columbia, "all meetings for religious worship, beyond the hour of ten
o'clock at night, of free negroes, mulattoes or slaves, shall be and they are hereby declared to be
unlawful." WORTHINGTON G. SNETHEN, THE BLACK CODE OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA IN
FORCE SEPTEMBER 1ST, 1848 (A. & F. Antislavery Society, 1848), reprinted in 2 STATUTES ON
SLAVERY: THE PAMPHLET LITERATURE 179, 224 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1988) (reprinting and
quoting ORDINANCES OF THE CORPORATION OF WASHINGTON (Oct. 29, 1836)). See generally
Lash, supra note 56, at 1134, n. 133. Interestingly, as early as 1790, anti-establishmentarians like
the Baptist John Leland denounced slaveowners' violation of blacks' "rights of conscience." See
CHARLES F. JAMES, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN
VIRGINIA 86 (1899) ("'Liberty of conscience, in matters of religion, is the right of slaves beyond
contradiction; and yet many masters and overseers will whip and torture the poor creatures for
going to meeting at night, when the labor of the day is over.'" (quoting Elder John Leland)).
234. For example, according to an 1833 Alabama law:
§ 42. If any slave or free person of color shall preach to, exhort, or harangue
any slave or slaves, or free persons of color, unless in the presence of five
respectable slave-holders, any such slave or free person of color so offending,
shall, on conviction before any justice of the peace, receive, by order of said
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Particularly threatening to the southern establishment of slavery was the
idea that the peculiar institution might violate the doctrines of Christianity.
All black religious assemblies were carefully monitored to assure the
promulgation of only pro-slavery Christianity. 23  In the 1830s, a new wave
of laws made it a crime, punishable by death, to write or distribute
236abolitionist literature. In 1850, Jesse McBride gave a young white girl a
pamphlet on the Ten Commandments which suggested that slaveholders lived
in violation of the Decalogue .237 McBride was convicted under a North
Carolina statute making it a crime knowingly to circulate or publish any
pamphlet with a tendency to cause insurrection or resistance in slaves.
Throughout the South, preachers criticizing slavery as contrary to the will of
239God faced public outrage and legal prosecution.
justice of the peace, thirty-nine lashes for the first offense, and fifty lashes for
every offense thereafter; and any person may arrest any such slave or free
person of color, and take him before a justice of the peace for trial: Provided,
That the negroes so haranguing or preaching, shall be licensed thereto by some
regular body of professing Christians immediately in the neighborhood, and to
whose society or church such negro shall properly belong.
A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA 398 (1833) (emphasis added); see also 2
STOKES, supra note 24, at 194.
235. See Lash, supra note 56, at 1135 n.135. Sermons to slaves invariably focused on the
duty to obey one's master. The biblical justification for slave obedience was derived from the
letters of Saint Paul in the New Testament, particularly Ephesians 6:5-8. Colossians 3:22, and
Philemon. See 3 THE BLACK ABOLITIONIST PAPERS 435 n. 17 (C. Peter Ripley ed., 1991).
236. See, e.g., DIGEST OF THE LAWS RELATIVE TO SLAVES AND PEOPLE OF FREE COLOUR IN
THE STATE OF LOUISIANA (Published by the Louisiana Constitutional and Anti-Fanatical Society
1835), reprinted in 2 STATUTES ON SLAVERY, supra note 233, at 47, 68.
237. Crooks and McBride, RALEIGH REG., Oct. 23, 1850, at 3, quoted in Michael K. Curtis,
The 1859 Crisis Over Hinton Helper's Book, the Impending Crisis: Free Speech, Slavery, and Some
Light on the Meaning of the First Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1113, 1136 (1993).
238. Id. See N.C. REV. STAT. ch. 34, § 17 (1837). McBride was sentenced "to
imprisonment for one year, to stand in the pillory for one hour, and to twenty lashes." Curtis,
supra note 237, at 1136.
239. The Reverend Elijah Pomeroy Lovejoy, editor of the Observer, a Saint Louis religious
journal that attacked slavery, had his presses destroyed by pro-slavery mobs three times. On
November 7, 1837, while defending his fourth press from destruction, he and one of his
companions were killed. See 2 STOKES, supra note 24, at 36. In 1839, a certain Mr. Barrett had
circulated an antislavery petition to Congress that denounced slavery in the District of Columbia as
"a sin against God and a foul stain on the national character." Commonwealth v. Barrett, 6 Va. (9
Leigh) 665, 665 (1839); see Curtis, supra note 237, at 1135. He was prosecuted under a Virginia
statute that prohibited "any member of an abolition or antislavery society . . .who shall come into
this state, and shall here maintain, by speaking or writing, that the owners of slaves have no
property in the same, or advocate or advise the abolition of slavery." See An Act to Suppress the
Circulation of Incendiary Publications, ch. 66, 1836 Va. Acts 44-45, § 1. Barrett was acquitted on
the ground that the Act required proof that he was a member of an abolitionist society.
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a. Objection #1: Breach of Peace Laws?
Although restrictions on "incendiary" literature fell most heavily on the
religiously-inspired abolitionist, perhaps the laws themselves could be
viewed as no more "religion-based" as the northern laws against public
blasphemy. For example, given the inflammatory nature of the slavery
debate and the southern fears of slave revolt, perhaps laws against public
expression of antislavery sentiment were analogous to the North's
prohibition on blasphemous statements that breached the public peace.240
Despite the "public peace" rationale of both laws against blasphemy and
"incendiary literature," the laws were applied differently. In the North,
blasphemy laws were interpreted to permit "good faith" expressions of
religious or atheistic dissent.241  By the 1860s, Buddhists, Mohammedans,
and "Nullifidians" in the North had as much of a right as any one else to
express their beliefs in an orderly manner. 24  In the South, laws were
240. In fact, the debate over slavery threatened speech in the North as well as in the slave-
holding states. In 1836, Governor William Marcy of New York advocated legislation that would
punish persons who engaged in acts calculated and intended to produce rebellion in other states. No
law was passed, but the proposal elicited a response from the leader of the New York antislavery
society, Alvan Stewart. Countering Marcy's argument that suppression of abolitionist speech was
not delegated to the federal government, but retained by the states, Stewart declared:
There is a class of rights of the most personal and sacred character to the
citizen, which are a portion of individual sovereignty, never surrendered by the
citizen . . . either to the State or General Government, and the Constitutions of
the States and Union have told the world, after enumerating them, that there is
a class of unsurrendered rights.
ALVAN STEWART, WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF ALVAN STEWART ON SLAVERY 65 (Luther R.
Marsh ed., 1860), quoted in Curtis, supra note 237, at 1132.
241. See Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. 312, 322 (1848) ("No man, living under the
protection of our institutions, can be coerced to profess any form of religious belief, or to practise
any peculiar mode of worship, in preference to another. In this respect, the Christian, the Jew, the
Mohammedan, and the Pagan alike are entitled to protection. Nay, the Infidel, who madly rejects
all belief in a Divine Essence, may safely do so, in reference to civil punishment, so long as he
refrains from the wanton and malicious proclamation of his opinions with intent to outrage the
moral and religious convictions of a community, the vast majority of whom are Christians.");
Sellers v. Dugan, 18 Ohio 489, 496 (1849) ("[I]t is the glory of our country that the right of belief
in any particular religious tenet without molestation on account thereof, is granted to every one; but
this principle can only be preserved by extending it equally to the unbeliever.").
242. See supra part II.A. 1. See also COOLEY, supra note 225, at 472. Cooley refuted Story's
proposition that the "truth of Christianity" has become part of the common law so that blasphemy
may be prosecuted on those grounds. Instead, Cooley believed that one could dispute the truth of
Christianity, but that "legal blasphemy implies that the words were uttered in a wanton manner,
with a wicked and malicious disposition, and not in a serious discussion upon any controverted point
in religion." Id. at 474. Jeremiah S. Black, Chief Judge of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
remarked in 1882: "Considering [laws against blasphemy] as religious offenses,-as sins against
God alone,-I agree that civil laws should notice them not at all." Jeremiah S. Black, The Christian
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aimed at the suppression of the idea, however expressed, that slavery was
against the will of God. Although such statutes were justified as "civil
regulations" necessary to keep the peace, they were triggered by a particular
belief about God and divine justice.
The distinction is crucial. The early blasphemy cases in the North
outlawed public challenges to the existence of God on the grounds that such
religious beliefs threatened to undermine the stability of the government.
243
This view was eventually discarded and replaced by the requirement that all
religious discussions take place in a manner unlikely to disturb the public
peace. Of course, the northern law left room for orderly adoption of
minority religious beliefs. In the South, however, the law prevented the
adoption of minority beliefs. Views about God which challenged the
legitimacy of slavery were, literally, unspeakable.
b. Objection #2: These Are "Free Exercise," Not "Establishment"
Concerns
When viewed in terms of modem religious clause jurisprudence, laws
suppressing black religious exercise in general, or the exercise of anti-
slavery Christianity in particular, seem to be more violations of the Free
Exercise Clause than impermissible religious establishments. This is due to
the common (modem) tendency of viewing the central purposes of the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses as prohibiting, respectively, the
suppor 44 or suppression245 of religion. Having traced the development of
the nonestablishment principle in the mid-nineteenth century, however, we
now know that throughout this period, the general understanding was that
any law which supported or suppressed religion as religion violated the
Religion, in THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION, A SERIES OF ARTICLES FROM THE NORTH AMERICAN
REVIEW 30 (1882).
243. See supra part II.A.1.
244. See, e.g., School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985) ("Although
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is characterized by few absolutes, the Clause does absolutely
prohibit government-financed or government-sponsored indoctrination into the beliefs of a particular
religious faith."); Committee for Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772 (1973) ("Primary
among those evils [against which the Establishment Clause guards] have been 'sponsorship,
financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.'") (quoting Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971));
Rosenberger v. Rector, 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2541 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("At the heart of the
Establishment Clause stands the prohibition against direct public funding [of religious activity].").
245. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993);
see also Philip Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 96
(1961) (interpreting the combined religion clauses as "prohibit[ing] classification in terms of
religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden"); Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State
and the Supreme Court": Kurland Revisited, 1989 Sup. CT. REV. 373.
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nonestablishment principle that government has no power over religion as
such. 246  Nonestablishment in the mid-nineteenth century was an aspect of
the "rights of conscience" which prohibited laws directly targeting minority
religious exercise.247
B. The Fourteenth Amendment
Having canvassed the evolution of the nonestablishment principle, we
now stand at the threshold of the Fourteenth Amendment. Whether those
who framed and adopted the Fourteenth Amendment specifically intended to
incorporate any of the rights contained in the first eight amendments is
beyond the scope of this article. My purpose is simply to determine whether
the Establishment Clause would have been considered an appropriate
candidate for incorporation if there was any such intention. Part II of this
article responded to the primary barrier to establishment incorporation: the
original federalist aspect of the Establishment Clause. By Reconstruction,
this barrier had been removed by the reinterpretation of the Establishment
Clause at both a state and federal level to express a principle of personal
freedom-the immunity from government power of the subject of religion.
However, even if no conceptual barrier against Establishment
incorporation existed, the question remains whether nonestablishment was a
likely subject for Fourteenth Amendment protection. Because the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to remedy violations of fundamental rights in the
southern states, the first part of this section explored southern regulation of
religion. Unlike the North, which had repudiated the notion of power over
the subject of religion, the South continued to exercise a great deal of power
over the form and content of religious exercise. The final question, then, is
whether there is reason to believe that the framers of the Fourteenth
246. According to an 1853 Senate Report on Congressional Chaplains, "If Congress has
passed, or should pass, any law which, fairly construed, has in any degree introduced . . .
disadvantages or penalties upon those who should reject its doctrines or belong to other
communions-such law would be a 'law respecting an establishment of religion,' and therefore, in
violation of the constitution." S. REP. No. 376, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1853) (emphasis added);
see also Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 3, 12 (1949) (describing "respecting" language in the original Establishment Clause as "a
two-edged word, which bans any law disfavoring as well as any law favoring an establishment of
religion") (emphasis in original).
247. Another possible objection is that such a reading of nonestablishment renders the Free
Exercise Clause redundant. However, this would be true only if the Free Exercise Clause protects
only against laws that explicitly target religious exercise. Although this tracks the current approach
of the Supreme Court, see generally Employment Div. v. Smith 494 U.S. 872 (1990). I have
argued elsewhere that this is an overly narrow reading of the incorporated Free Exercise Clause.
See Lash, supra note 56.
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Amendment either did not consider southern violations of the
nonestablishment principle, or considered such violations as less important
than other personal freedoms, such as the right to Free Exercise.
1. Commentary on Southern Regulation of Religion by the Architects of
the Fourteenth Amendment
Southern regulation of religion was acknowledged and condemned by a
variety of members of the Thirty-ninth Congress. Lyman Trumbull
introduced the 1866 Civil Rights Act by pointing out that, under slavery,
blacks were prohibited from "exercising the functions of a minister of the
Gospel," 248 and that the Black Codes continued to violate these "privileges
essential to freemen."249 Congressman Cydnor B. Tompkins of Ohio noted
that southern states would "condemn as a felon the man who dares proclaim
the precepts of our holy religion." 250  Representative James M. Ashley
pointed out that "[u]nder the plea of Christianizing [blacks], [the South] has
enslaved, beaten, maimed, and robbed millions of men for whose salvation
the Man of sorrows died . . . . It has silenced every free pulpit within its
control, and debauched thousands which ought to have been independent."
251
248. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 27 & 29, 1866), reprinted in THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENT'S DEBATES: THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY
DEBATES IN CONGRESS ON THE 13TH, 14TH, AND 15TH AMENDMENTS 121 (1967) [hereinafter
RECONSTRUCTION DEBATES].
249. Id. According to Professor Gary Leedes, "[there is less than a scintilla of evidence
indicating that the Thirty-Ninth Congress intended to limit the state government's power to establish
religion." Gary C. Leedes, Rediscovering the Link Between the Establishment Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment: The Citizenship Declaration, 26 IND. L. REV. 469, 508 n.257 (1993). As
his sole support for this statement, Leedes quotes Lyman Trumbull in the Thirty-ninth Congress's
deliberations over the impending Civil Rights Bill: "Now, our laws are to be enacted with a view to
educate, improve, enlighten, and Christianize the negro." Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 322 (1866) (emphasis added)). Leedes interprets Trumbull's statement as "pro-
establishment." Id. Just what law Trumbull was proposing that would "Christianize" the freed
blacks, Leedes does not say. As this section makes clear, however, Trumbull and most of the other
abolitionist Republicans believed that providing blacks with the protections of the First Amendment
would allow blacks to hear, accept, and practice the full Christian faith for the first time. Even a
cursory review of Trumbull's other comments makes clear that he had no intention of coercively
Christianizing the freed blacks, or adopting any kind of religious-based law. If Trumbull also
hoped that nonestablishment and free exercise would result in the "Christianizing" of the South, his
views track those of his fellow abolitionists and in no way undermine his commitment to
nonestablishment values. In this way, Trumbull's comment has a vastly different connotation than
that of James Ashley. See infra text accompanying note 251.
250. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1857 (1860); see also Remarks of Congressman
Sidney Edgerton of Ohio, id. at 930 (preachers in the South could not "discuss the moral bearings
of slavery").
251. RECONSTRUCTION DEBATES, supra note 248, at 81 (emphasis added).
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Given this recognition of southern regulation of religion, it is not
surprising to find the Establishment Clause, along with the Free Exercise
Clause, mentioned as "privileges or immunities," which were to be protected
under the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1871, John Bingham, the author of
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, recited in their entirety the first
eight amendments to the Constitution-including the Establishment Clause-
and declared his belief that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to
protect all such "privileges and immunities." 252 In an 1864 speech on the
floor of the Senate, Senator and future vice-president Henry Wilson read the
entire First Amendment-including the Establishment Clause-and declared
that the southern states had trampled on these "great rights," which were
"essential to liberty. ,253
Some scholars have noted that the people involved in the framing of the
Fourteenth Amendment spoke more often about southern violations of "free
exercise" and "the rights of conscience" than they did the "establishment of
religion." For example, in his 1864 speech, Henry Wilson noted how "[t]he
bitter, cruel, relentless persecutions of the Methodists in the South, almost as
void of pity as those which were visited upon the Huguenots in France, tell
how utterly slavery disregards the right to a free exercise of religion." 254
Likewise, although Henry Dawes in the Forty-Second Congress listed "free
exercise of his religious belief, and freedom of speech and of the press" as
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, he did not mention the
255Establishment Clause. As a final example, John Bingham, in a speech
before the House in 1871, declared that the Fourteenth Amendment gave
Congress the power to prevent the South from restricting "freedom of
press," "freedom of speech," and "the rights of conscience., 256  As did
Wilson and Dawes, Bingham mentions other First Amendment freedoms as
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, but omits any explicit reference
to the Establishment Clause. Scholars such as Akhil Amar have suggested
that these "abbreviated lists" imply that nonestablishment was not considered
a personal right on the same level as free exercise or free speech.
257
Upon reflection, it appears that these lists were exactly that:
abbreviations. For example, in his 1864 speech, Henry Wilson first reads
the entire First Amendment-including the Establishment Clause-and then
252. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 31, 1871), reprinted in RECONSTRUCTION
DEBATES, supra note 248, at 510-11.
253. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864).
254. Id. (emphasis added).
255. See RECONSTRUCTION DEBATES, supra note 248, at 475-76 (remarks of Henry Dawes).
256. Id. at 85.
257. Amar, Constitution, supra note 7, at 1158 n. 132 (citations omitted).
27:1085] 1143
ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL
goes on to paraphrase the amendment as protecting "[flreedom of religious
opinion, freedom of speech and press, and the right of assemblage for the
purpose of petition. Notice how Wilson substitutes for the religion
clauses the phrase "freedom of religious opinion." Again, to modern ears,
"freedom of religious opinion" sounds more like a matter for the Free
Exercise Clause. However, to the nineteenth century mind, suppression of
religious opinion was the quintessential example of a government-imposed
religious establishment. Similarly, in 1871, Bingham first lists the entire
First Amendment-including the Establishment Clause-as examples of the
privileges or immunities protected under Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 259 Only later does he refer to southern restriction of "the rights
of conscience." 260  Even Senator Wilson's lament about the violation of
Methodist free exercise in the South is rendered ambiguous by his
comparison to the French persecution of the Huguenots-a religious-based
persecution.
261
In fact, the various remarks made by Reconstruction Congressmen reveal
that little effort was made to distinguish between "free exercise," "the rights
of conscience," and the wording of both the Establishment and Free Exercise
clauses. This is not surprising given the fact that the rights of conscience
were interpreted to include freedom from government-imposed
establishments-a freedom which was itself considered an aspect of free
exercise. Thus, even when the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
focused on the free exercise of religion, there is no reason a priori to
interpret this as elevating the Free Exercise Clause over the Establishment
Clause as a candidate for incorporation. The framers would not have made
such a distinction: the rights of conscience included both free exercise and
nonestablishment components. As Democratic Senator Thomas Norwood
conceded in 1874:
Before [the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment] any state might
have established a particular religion, or restricted freedom of
speech or of the press .... A state could have deprived its citizens
of any of the privileges and immunities contained in those eight
articles, but the Federal Government could not. But can a State do
so now? If not why? . . . The reason is, that the citizens of the
258. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864), reprinted in RECONSTRUCTION
DEBATES, supra note 248, at 65.
259. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84 (1864), reprinted in RECONSTRUCTION
DEBATES, supra note 248, at 510.
260. Id. at 85.
261. See generally G.A. ROTHROCK, THE HUGUENOTS: A BIOGRAPHY OF A MINORITY
(1979). N.M. SUTHERLAND, THE HUGUENOT STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION (1980).
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States have the new guarantee under the fourteenth amendment;
and though new privileges were not thereby conferred, additional
guarantees were. 262
C. The Blaine Amendment
In 1875, Representative James G. Blaine proposed a constitutional
amendment that would have prohibited the states from making any law
"respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."263 For years, the so-called "Blaine Amendment" has stood as an
affront to the doctrine of incorporation: if the Fourteenth Amendment had
already incorporated these rights through the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, then why this attempt at redundancy? In fact, since the Blaine
Amendment was ultimately rejected, isn't this evidence that popular
sentiment was against incorporating the Establishment Clause against the
states?
264
While the full implications of the Blaine Amendment are beyond the
scope of this article, 265 certain aspects of the Blaine Amendment actually
support the case for the incorporation of the Establishment Clause. For
example, the Blaine Amendment places the language of the federal
Establishment Clause side by side with the language of the Free Exercise
Clause, and prevents the states from interfering with either one. This alone
seems to indicate that the language of the Establishment Clause had become
associated with substantive rights and was no longer interpreted merely as an
262. CONG. GLOBE, 43d Cong., 1st Sess. (1874), reprinted in RECONSTRUCTION DEBATES,
supra note 248, at 676. Despite its application against the states, Norwood believed that no new
"privileges" were conferred by the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. His statement reveals
the pervasive reinterpretation of the federal Establishment Clause. The original clause conferred a
"privilege" upon the states. The incorporated clause transfers this right from the states to individual
citizens.
263. 4 CONG. REC. 205 (1875).
264. See Leitzau, supra note 11, at 1208; Conkle, supra note 7, at 1138-39 (citations omitted).
265. The significance of the Blaine Amendment for the general debate over incorporation has
been exhaustively treated elsewhere. See CURTIS, supra note 7, at 169-70; Raoul Berger,
Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment: A Nine-Lived Cat, 42 OHIO ST.
L.J. 435, 464-65 (1981) [hereinafter Berger, Nine-Lived Cat]; Raoul Berger, The Fourteenth
Amendment: Light from the Fifteenth, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 311, 346-47 (1979); Michael K. Curtis,
Further Adventures of the Nine Lived Cat: A Response to Mr. Berger on Incorporation of the Bill of
Rights, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 89, 114 (1982); Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: A Reply
to Michael Curtis' Response, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 16-17 (1983); Alfred W. Meyer, The Blaine
Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 64 HARV. L.REV. 939 (1951); F. William O'Brien, The Blaine
Amendment 1875-1876, 41 U. DET. L. REV. 137 (1963); Note, Rethinking the Incorporation of the
Establishment Clause: A Federalist View, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1700, 1713-14 (1992).
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expression of federalism. 266 Only after decades of reinterpretation could the
language of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses be used in the same
breath as candidates for "incorporation." At the very least, this shows that
nonestablishment is an equal candidate with the Free Exercise Clause for
incorporation.
But perhaps this is no more than winning the battle and losing the war. If
the Blaine Amendment stands for the proposition that neither the Free
Exercise nor Establishment Clauses were intended to be incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment, it is a hollow victory to prove that both rights were
equally rejected. Upon closer examination, however, it is questionable that
the Blaine Amendment had anything to do with the principles of
nonestablishment or Free Exercise.
1. Anti-Catholic Animus and the Blaine Amendment
In 1875, President Grant recommended amending the Constitution to
forbid "the teaching in [public] schools of religious, atheistic, or pagan
tenets; and prohibiting the granting of any school funds, or school taxes...
for the benefit or in aid, directly or indirectly, of any religious sect or
denomination. " 267  A few days later, Blaine introduced to the House ofRepresentatives the following proposed amendment to the Constitution:
No state shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by
taxation in any State for the support of public schools, or derived
from any public fund therefor, nor any public lands devoted
thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect, nor
shall any money so raised or lands so devoted be divided between
religious sects or denominations. 268
Passed by the House, the proposal was amended during debate in the
Senate to read:
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no religious test shall
ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust
266. As one example of this reinterpretation, consider the continued use of the word
"respecting." This was placed in the original clause in order to prevent interference with state
establishments. Once the states themselves are prohibited from establishment of religion, there is
no reason to continue using this peculiar language. No reason, that is, unless this peculiar language
has come to be associated with personal freedom.
267. Ulysses S. Grant, Seventh Annual Message, December 7, 1875, reprinted IN ULYSSES S.
GRANT, 1822-1885: CHRONOLOGY-DOCUMENTS-BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AIDS 92 (Philip R. Moran ed.,
1968).
268. 4 CONG. REC. 205 (1875).
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under any State. No public property, and no public revenue ...
shall be appropriated to, or made or used for, the support of any
school, educational or other institution, under the control of any
religious or anti-religious sect, organization, or denomination, or
wherein the particular creed or tenets of any religious or
anti-religious sect . . . shall be taught. . . .This article shall not be
construed to prohibit the reading of the Bible in any school or
institution.269
Opponents of Establishment Clause incorporation (or incorporation in
general) argue that if incorporation occurred with the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the first clause of the Blaine Amendment is
redundant. 270  Proponents of incorporation respond that, by the time of the
Blaine Amendment, Supreme Court decisions like The Slaughterhouse
Cases271 had eviscerated the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, a
Blaine-type amendment in 1875 would not be redundant.272
Both sides of the debate miss the mark. 273  Each assumes that Blaine's
proposal was intended to make the norms of the federal religion clauses
applicable against states. In reality, the Blaine Amendment would have
amended the norms of the First Amendment. In order to understand this, we
must look beyond the first sentence of the Blaine Amendment and
concentrate on what was almost certainly the main purpose of the proposal:
Keeping public educational funds in the hands of the Protestant-dominated
public schools and out of the hands of Roman Catholic parochial schools.
Blaine's proposal was not the first attempt to amend the Constitution to
prohibit the funding of sectarian schools. In 1870, Mr. Burdett introduced in
269. Id. at 5580.
270. See, e.g., Berger, Nine-Lived Cat, supra note 265, at 464-65; Berger, The Fourteenth
Amendment: Light from the Fifteenth, supra note 265, at 346-47; Meyer, supra note 265, at 939-
45; O'Brien, supra note 265, at 137; Note, supra note 265, at 1712.
271. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
272. See CURTIS, supra note 7, at 169-70.
273. Both sides have evidence in support of their view. Anti-incorporationists can cite Senator
Frelinghuysen's remarks in support of the Blaine Amendment where he notes that the Amendment
"prohibits the States, for the first time, from the establishment of religion, from prohibiting its free
exercise, and from making any religious test a qualification to office." 4 CONG. REC. 5561 (1876).
Pro-incorporationists can cite Senator Morton's lament that "the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments which we supposed broad, ample, and specific, have, I fear, been very much impaired
by construction, and one of them in some respects almost destroyed by construction." Id. at 5585.
Morton therefore suggested that the Blaine Amendment be made as specific as possible to avoid a
similar fate at the hands of the Supreme Court. Id. Although I believe the pro-incorporationists
have the better of the argument, it is more for the reasons stated in the text than on the basis of
Morton's lament.
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the House of Representatives the following proposed constitutional
amendment:
Section 1. No State or municipal corporation within any State of
the United States shall levy, or collect any tax for the support or
aid of any Sectarian, Denominational or Religious School or
educational establishment; nor shall the legislature of any State or
the corporate authorities of any municipality within any State
appropriate any money, or make any donation from the public
funds or property of such State or Municipality for the support of
or aid of any Sectarian, Religious, or Denominational school or
educational establishment.274
Burdett's Amendment (which, like Blaine's, failed to win congressional
approval) does not mention the religion clauses. Instead, the Amendment
tracks the language of similar state constitutional amendments that were
adopted during the same period. 275  These amendments had nothing to do
with separation of church and state; They were preemptive strikes against
Roman Catholic efforts to share in the government funding of Protestant
public schools.
As previously discussed, Protestant religious exercises were ubiquitous
in the common schools of the mid-nineteenth century. Catholics, when
given the choice between a free Protestant education and no education at all,
often chose the latter. 277 Although some states flirted with the idea of equal
funding for public and private schools, Nativist opposition barred any efforts
278in that direction. In order to prevent any future attempts at equal funding,
Nativists sponsored constitutional amendments which prohibited educational
aid to sectarian institutions .279
274. H.J. Res. 254, CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2754 (Apr. 18, 1870), quoted in F.
William O'Brien, The States and "No Establishment': Proposed Amendments to the Constitution
Since 1798, 4 WASHBURN L.J. 183, 204 (1965).
275. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
276. See supra part II.C.1.
277. See Tarr, supra note 173, at 91. Tarr points out that although the Roman Catholic
hierarchy encouraged the establishment of parochial schools, the poverty of the immigrant Catholic
Church in America prevented the immediate institution of a wide-spread parochial school system.
Id.
278. For example, in 1842, the New York Legislature prohibited public funding of any school
in New York City in which "any religious sectarian doctrine or tenet shall be taught, inculcated, or
practiced." Id. at 92. This blocked attempts by the New York City Assembly to permit funding for
Catholic parochial schools in districts where Catholics were a majority. Id.
279. See supra note 182. In fact, states admitted to the Union after 1876 were compelled by
Congress to write into their constitution a requirement that their school systems be "free from
sectarian control." See McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 220 n.9 (1948).
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Sometimes cited by scholars (and the Supreme Court) as reflecting the
inexorable evolution of Jeffersonian Separatism,280 these provisions were
actually attempts to give the Protestant majority an educational monopoly.
The most flagrant example of this is found in the Senate's version of the
Blaine Amendment itself.28' Although educational funds were denied to
"sectarian" (read: Roman Catholic) schools, the amendment was not to be
"construed to prohibit the reading of the Bible (read: Protestant King James
version) in any school or institution. ,282 This bears a striking resemblance to
the 1856 Know Nothing election platform which also called for "schools
without sectarian influence" while at the same time opposing Catholic
attempts to remove the Bible from the public schools.
283
By constitutionalizing the use of the Protestant Bible and prohibiting
public funds to "sectarian" institutions, the Blaine Amendment would have
significantly amended contemporary First Amendment norms. For the first
time, the Constitution would have recognized and protected state power to
coercively indoctrinate students in the tenets of a particular religion.284 Not
only were such provisions adopted alongside of compulsory education laws,
but the day was not far off where anti-Catholic animus would result in the
passage of laws that attem ted to shut down private schools and force
attendance at public school.
Those who participated in the debates over the Blaine Amendment were
well aware of the real issue underlying the proposal. Senator Morton
declared that America was a "Protestant country," and warned of a "large
and growing class of people in this country who are utterly opposed to our
280. See 4 STOKES, supra note 33, at 271; McCollum, 333 U.S. at 218; Kiryas Joel v.
Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2490 (1994) (citing New York's refusal to equally fund Catholic Schools
in the nineteenth century).
281. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
282. Id.
283. The full text of the 1856 Know Nothing platform reads:
The education of the youth of our country in schools provided by the State,
which schools shall be common to all, without distinction of creed or party,
and free from any influence or direction of a denominational or partisan
character.
And inasmuch as Christianity, by the Constitutions of nearly all the States;
by the decisions of most eminent judicial authorities, and by the consent of the
people of America, is considered an element of our political system, and the
Holy Bible is at once the source of Christianity and the depository and fountain
of all civil and religious freedom, we oppose every attempt to exclude it from
the schools thus established in the states.
Reprinted in 2 STOKES, supra note 24, at 67-68.
284. See generally ANBINDER, supra note 154.
285. See Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (invalidating one such
law on the basis of the Liberty Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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present system of common schools, and who are opposed to any school that
does not teach their religion." Democrats ridiculed the Republicans'
attempts to bootstrap an anti-Catholic amendment into the Constitution by
attaching it to the uncontroversial proposition that states may not establish a
286religion. According to Democratic Senator Eaton, it was already the case
that "no State can pass any law respecting religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. ,28 In remarks made just before the vote that defeated the
proposal, 288 Senator Saulsbury deplored the Republicans' cynical support of
the amendment:
When I listened to-day to the debates upon this question, when I
heard the appeals that were made by the Senators to the religious
prejudices and passions of mankind, I trembled for the future of
my country. . . . Have not religious persecutions and appeals to
religious prejudices stained the earth with blood and wrung from
the hearts of millions the deepest agonies? Yet I see springing up
in my own country for the base purposes of a party, to promote a
presidential election, a disposition to drag down the sacred cross
itself and make it subservient to party ends. I appeal to Heaven to
thwart the purpose of all such partisans!
289
Given the Blaine Amendment's anti-Catholic animus, as well as its
substantial amendment of contemporary nonestablishment principles, the
rejection of the Amendment seems rather weak evidence against
incorporation in general and the Establishment Clause in particular. Indeed,
it seems the opposite. Both the text and the debates over the Amendment
indicate that the Establishment Clause was understood as the substantive
equal of the Free Exercise Clause, and that the principle of nonestablishment
applied at both a state and federal level.
290
286. 4 CONG. REC. 5589 (1876) (remarks of Senator Bogy) ("The Pope, the old Pope of
Rome, is to be the great bull we are all to attack."); id. at 5583 (remarks of Senator Whyte) ("[the
amendment is] nearly an accusation against a large body of fellow-citizens . . . . "). The House
Report indicated considerable disagreement as the necessity for any amendment at all. 4 CONG.
REC. 5189 (1875).
287. 4 CONG. REC. 5592 (1876).
288. In a vote falling along strict party lines (with the exception of one Republican who voted
against the amendment), the Blaine Amendment failed by two votes to get the needed two-thirds
majority.
289. 4 CONG. REC. 5594 (1876).
290. Besides serving as a reminder of the discriminatory purposes which animated the "no aid"
provisions of the nineteenth century, the failed Blaine Amendment also serves as a remarkable
barometer of nonestablishment sentiment in the Reconstruction period. Whatever their views on
incorporation, all sides agreed that no state should be free to establish a religion. Even the
opponents of the amendment agreed with the principle of nonestablishment as one of the
fundamental rights of conscience. See id. at 5581 (remarks of Senator Kernan) (although some
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D. Implications: The Incorporation of the Nonestablishment Principle
1. Antidisestablishmentarianism
The incorporation of the nonestablishment principle calls into question a
number of modern approaches to the Establishment Clause. Most
proponents of establishment incorporation focus on the prohibitive aspect of
the Clause: government may make no law which establishes religion. Anti-
incorporationists, on the other hand, tend to concentrate on the protective
aspect by highlighting the original intention to protect state establishments.
By shifting the focus away from the founding, however, and taking seriously
the evolution in thought that occurred between 1789 and 1868, neither aspect
need be sacrificed: both are reconfigured.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, laws which either support or inhibit
religion as religion create Establishment problems. In this way, the
incorporated Clause remains both prohibitive (keeping government from
adopting its favorite religion) and protectionist (protecting dissenting
religious institutions from government attempts at "disestablishment"). In
fact, the Supreme Court recognized the protectionist (or antidisestablishment)
aspect of the Establishment Clause in some of its earliest incorporation cases.
For example, in Everson v. Board of Education,291 Justice Black noted that
"State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to
favor them."292 Although rarely applied by the Court in later Establishment
cases, 293 this aspect of the Clause is explicitly recognized in the second
prong of the so-called Lemon test which prohibits government action that has
the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.
294
The protectionist aspect of the incorporated Establishment Clause also
sheds some light on the modern debate over government neutrality. Because
states at the founding made "distinctions based on religious creeds" most now had "liberal
provisions . . . on the subject of the sacred rights of conscience."). Democrat Bogy declared,
"Who in this country is in favor of uniting church and state? Who in this country ... is opposed to
religious freedom? There would be no liberty . . . without entire separation of church and state."
Id. at 5589. Senator Eaton stated his belief that states were as likely to "legalize a system of
religion" as they would be to "legalize murder." Id. at 5592.
291. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
292. Id. at 18. Similarly, in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), Justice
Jackson described the Establishment Clause as prohibiting laws which either compelled or restricted
religious exercise.
293. For a free exercise case that implicitly recognizes the "antidisestablishment" principle,
see Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 2226 (1993) (citing prior
Establishment Clause cases in support of decision striking down an attempt to "zone out" the
practice of the Santeria religion).
294. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
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the principle goal of the incorporated Clause is to deny power over the
subject of religion, this principle does not seem thwarted by the incidental
aiding of religious exercise. In fact, if the incorporated clause prohibits
government action which advances or inhibits on the basis of religious belief,
not only might equal disbursement of government funds be allowed under the
Clause, but refusal to .do so on the basis of religious belief might well be
295prohibited. The antidisestablishment aspect of the incorporated Clause is
triggered any time the government has disadvantaged a group solely on the
basis of its religious viewpoint. At the very least, the Clause could never be
invoked as a bar to equal treatment.296
2. Free Exercise Implications
The antidisestablishment aspect of ihe incorporated Establishment Clause
also raises issues regarding the scope of the incorporated Free Exercise
Clause. To our ears, laws that "disestablish" sound a lot like laws
"prohibiting the free exercise of religion." If so, doesn't the incorporated
Establishment Clause render the Free Exercise Clause redundant?
Not at all. The incorporation reading of the Establishment Clause
prohibits laws which regulate religion as religion. The slaveholding states
violated this principle when they regulated the religious exercise of the
slaves, or controlled religious expression as it related to slavery. On the
other hand, it is quite possible that generally applicable laws also might
unjustifiably burden religious exercise. For example, in addition to southern
laws which directly regulated religious exercise, a number of laws indirectly
burdened religious exercise in the South. In particular, laws which
prohibited slaves from learning to read necessarily prevented them from
reading the Bible. These laws were also cited by members of the Thirty-
ninth Congress as abridgments of "privileges or immunities" which
295. This is a point the Supreme Court initially emphasized in the first cases to apply the
religion clauses against the states. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 302 (1940) ("The constitutional
inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls
compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom
of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the
individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free
exercise of the chosen form of religion."); Everson v. Board of Ed., 330 U.S. 1, 18 ("State power
is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them.").
296. The Supreme Court may be moving, if unsteadily, in this direction. See Rosenberger v.
Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2520 (1995) (striking down on free
speech grounds state university's refusal to equally fund student publication with religious
viewpoint). But see Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 408-14 (1985); School Dist. of Grand Rapids
v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 381-85 (1985).
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impermissibly abridged the right to free exercise of religion.297 Thus,
application of the incorporated religion clauses depends on whether the law
directly or indirectly targets religion for a particular benefit or burden.
298
Establishment concerns are triggered when a law directly targets religion as
religion. Free Exercise concerns simpliciter are triggered when an otherwise
religiously neutral law impermissibly burdens religious exercise.
CONCLUSION
When dealing with the subject of religion we have passed beyond
the limits of human law, and are dealing with spiritual things that
reach beyond time. The benefits of religion are not to be enforced
299by penal enactments.
The scholars are right. The original Establishment Clause cannot be
incorporated against the states. But time did not stop at the Founding. Our
modern understanding of religious liberty did not spring full grown from the
head of Thomas Jefferson, nor, for that matter, from the head of Justice
Black. 3° Obscured by decades of references to the Virginia Experience is a
297. See Lash, supra note 56, at 1152.
298. In fact, contemporary treatises on civil rights distinguished between laws that
"disestablished" religion, and generally applicable laws that indirectly affected free exercise of
religion. In his section describing "unlawful establishments," Thomas Cooley notes: "[w]hatever
establishes a distinction against one class or sect is, to the extent to which the distinction operates
unfavorably, a persecution; and, if based on religious grounds, is religious persecution. It is not
toleration which is established in our system, but religious equality." COOLEY, supra note 225, at
469 (emphasis added). On the other hand, in his section on interference with free exercise, Cooley
states that "[riestraints upon the free exercise of religion according to the dictates of conscience" are
also "not lawful." Id. at 469-70. According to Cooley, "[n]o external authority is to place itself
between the finite being and the Infinite, when the former is seeking to render that homage which is
due, and in a mode which commends itself to his belief as suitable for him to render and acceptable
to its object." Id.
Cooley thus distinguishes between laws which "establish a distinction against a religious
belief," and laws which act as a "restraint upon the free exercise of religion." Obviously, both
affect free exercise. The difference is that the former does so on the basis of religion while the
latter (by implication) does not. Thus, intentional regulation of religion (for or against) is an
"establishment" matter, whereas non-religious based "restraints" belong to the realm of free
exercise.
299. Senator Frederick Frelinghuysen, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. (1872), reprinted in
RECONSTRUCTION DEBATES, supra note 248, at 622 (rejecting Sumner's proposal to regulate
southern churches).
300. In his critique of my article on Free Exercise, Steven Smith notes that, if I am right,
"Madison, Jefferson, Isaac Backus and John Leland, would be displaced as definers of constitutional
religious freedom by John Bingham, Thaddeus Stevens, Charles Sumner, and their
contemporaries." SMITH, supra note 12, at 53. Smith's threat, of course, is only half-serious,
since his own approach would wipe both sets of actors off the interpretive stage. See id. at 55
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long and painful struggle over the meaning of "establishment" and "free
exercise." In arguments played out in countless state court proceedings,
state legislative assembly meetings, and the debates of the Reconstruction
Congress, lines were drawn between the proponents of religious toleration
and the advocates of nonestablishment. Gradually, case by case, the federal
Constitution's declaration of "no power" was reinterpreted to express an
aspect of the freedom of conscience. By 1868, the (Non)Establishment
Clause was understood to be a liberty as fully capable of incorporation as
any other provision in the first eight amendments to the Constitution.
(rejecting originalism as an interpretive norm). Far more serious, however, is Smith's concern that
using 19th century law as a touchstone would introduce Protestant triumphanalism into the norms of
the Establishment Clause. Id. at 53-54. As this article points out, however, a majority, made up of
Protestants, Catholics and various stripes of religious separationists, came to interpret the
Establishment Clause as expressing the nonestablishment principle of "no power" over the subject
of religion.
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